Objectives of social entrepreneurs and federal lending programs, and the optimal allocation of external funds by Starke, Christoph
 
  
OBJECTIVES OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS  
AND FEDERAL LENDING PROGRAMS, 
AND THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION  
OF EXTERNAL FUNDS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inauguraldissertation 
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades 
 
Doctor rerum politicarum 
 
vorgelegt und angenommen 
an der Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft 
der Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Verfasser: Christoph Starke 
Geburtsdatum und –ort: 26. August 1978, Magdeburg 
Arbeit eingereicht am: 31. Mai 2010 
Gutachter der Dissertation: Prof. Dr. Matthias G. Raith 
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Gerhard Schwödiauer 
Datum der Disputation:  03. November 2010 
                                                                                                                    
 ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
TABLE OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................................... III 
1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 1 
2 SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS ............................................................................................................... 5 
2.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 6 
2.2 RATIONING BY UNIFORM USER FEES AND NON-PRICE ALLOCATION INSTRUMENTS ..................... 20 
2.2.1 THE MODEL ............................................................................................................................... 20 
2.2.2 INTERIOR AND CORNER SOLUTIONS ............................................................................................. 26 
2.2.3 VARIATION IN DONATIONS ........................................................................................................... 33 
2.2.4 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 39 
2.2.5 APPENDIX .................................................................................................................................. 40 
2.3 RATIONING BY USER-FEE DISCRIMINATION AND QUALITY DILUTION ........................................... 43 
2.3.1 THE MODEL ............................................................................................................................... 43 
2.3.2 VARIATIONS IN DONATIONS AND INPUT COSTS ............................................................................. 52 
2.3.3 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 57 
2.3.4 APPENDIX: PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS 2.6-2.10 ........................................................................... 58 
2.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH .......................................................................................... 63 
3 FEDERAL LENDING PROGRAMS .................................................................................................. 66 
3.1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 67 
3.2 FEDERAL LENDING OBJECTIVES ..................................................................................................... 71 
3.3 THE MODEL ................................................................................................................................... 73 
3.4 ALTERNATIVE LENDING STRUCTURES ........................................................................................... 76 
3.4.1 FIXED GUARANTEE RATE, MARKET DETERMINED INTEREST RATE ................................................ 77 
3.4.2 FIXED INTEREST SUBSIDIZATION, NO GUARANTEE ....................................................................... 78 
3.5 OPTIMAL LENDING STRUCTURES ................................................................................................... 79 
3.6 THE LENDING STRUCTURES OF THE SBA AND KFW ...................................................................... 84 
3.7 GENERALIZATION OF THE MODEL .................................................................................................. 86 
3.8 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................. 88 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................... 90 
                                                                                                                    
 iii
TABLE OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 2.1: Percent of population in developing countries living below $1.00-$2.50 a day 
in 2005 ................................................................................................................................... 8 
Figure 2.2: Sources of nonprofit income in 1995, by country ............................................. 10 
Figure 2.3: Sources of nonprofit income in 1995, by field (7 countries) ............................ 11 
Figure 2.4: The allocative outcome of rationing by user fees and the non-price instrument.
 ............................................................................................................................................. 23 
Figure 2.5: A utility function for a moderate level of poverty aversion and the interior 
optimum. .............................................................................................................................. 31 
Figure 2.6: A decrease of the optimal project volume as the highly poverty-averse 
entrepreneurial reaction. ...................................................................................................... 35 
Figure 2.7: The shift of the utility function due to an increase in donations. ...................... 36 
Figure 2.8: Allocation effects of the choice of quality and target group. ............................ 47 
Figure 2.9: Corner allocations and an arbitrary interior solution. ....................................... 50 
Figure 2.10: A complete shift of the target group as a weakly inequity-averse reaction on 
an increase in input costs ..................................................................................................... 56 
Figure 3.1: Comparison of the total funding volume of SBA and KfW between 2003 and 
2009 ..................................................................................................................................... 70 
Figure 3.2: Market curve, private rate of return function and the loan gap ......................... 74 
Figure 3.3: Fixed guarantee rate, market determined interest rate ...................................... 78 
Figure 3.4: Fixed interest subsidization, no guarantee ........................................................ 79 
Figure 3.5: The costs of alternative lending structures ........................................................ 80 
Figure 3.6: Minimal costs of the optimal lending structure ................................................ 82 
Figure 3.7: Optimal lending structure in presence of processing costs ............................... 83 
Figure 3.8: The lending policy of the SBA ......................................................................... 85 
Figure 3.9: Transferability of derived results ...................................................................... 87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
2
Economic theory justifies governmental intervention in the market economy by the 
existence of market failures. Through a well-targeted redistribution the government 
eliminates such malfunctions and achieves a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources. 
Standard textbooks on welfare economics pinpoint several causes for market failure, e.g. 
asymmetric information, natural monopolies, externalities, and public goods. 
The prevalence of market failures can be regarded as having both a limiting as well as 
enhancing effect on entrepreneurship. Intuitively, the malfunction of markets relevant to 
the formation of a firm complicates or even impedes its implementation, thereby 
preventing opportunities for value creation from being exploited. A particularly serious 
failure occurs in credit markets. Innovative and, thus, socially desirable start-ups cannot be 
launched due to a lack of credit accessibility. The positive externalities caused by the 
dissemination of new information are not taken into account by private banks when 
making their financing decisions. Governments across the world have recognized this 
market failure and, in response, have initiated so-called federal lending programs. With 
external tax revenues at hand, they subsidize interest rates or guarantee private lending. 
However, governments do not always intervene and market failures remain partly 
uncorrected. The elimination of these failures constitutes opportunities for entrepreneurs to 
create social value through a privately organized reallocation of externally raised funds, 
e.g. donations or grants. Individuals exploiting such opportunities are typically classified 
social entrepreneurs. There is a broad consensus among scientists that the internalization 
of externalities caused by poverty, i.e. some individuals perceive a disutility caused by low 
satisfaction levels of others’ basic human needs, represents one of the most challenging 
opportunities for social value creation. 
In this dissertation we investigate optimal market failure correction from both the 
private and governmental perspective. More specifically, we theoretically analyze the 
optimal allocation of external funds by social entrepreneurs aiming at alleviating poverty, 
on the one hand, and federal lending programs aiming at securing credit accessibility for 
innovative start-ups, on the other hand. To this date, both issues have been insufficiently 
analyzed in the literature. Our main criticism is that the postulated objectives of actors 
show substantial conceptual weaknesses and often fail to reflect empirical evidence. 
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Moreover, there is a gap of theoretical work which analyzes optimal federal lending in the 
presence of information spillovers.  
Chapter 2 considers two models of nonprofit entrepreneurial behaviour. In both 
models, the social entrepreneur observes a number of differently poor individuals who are 
unable to satisfy a basic human need such as food, shelter, or clothing. The entrepreneur 
plans to set up a nonprofit organization with the intention of allocating a social good to 
these needy individuals. Restricted by an exogenously given amount of third-party funds, 
however, she is unable to serve all applying individuals and, hence, must ration them. 
Within this setting, our contribution augments the literature on the pricing and rationing 
behaviour of nonprofit firms.  
As a further specification, we characterize the social entrepreneur as an inequity-averse 
decision maker, who draws a disutility from a deviation of an individual’s consumption 
possibilities from a specific social reference level. By providing needy individuals with the 
social good, the entrepreneur reduces the inequity and, hence, her own disutility. We 
thereby build on recent experimental economic research which investigates general social 
preferences by means of simple distribution games.  
In the first model of chapter 2, the entrepreneur rations individuals by charging a 
uniform user fee for the social good, where she is confronted with the following trade-off: 
The higher the fee paid by the recipient, the more people in need can be served by the 
additional revenues. However, by charging a fee, the entrepreneur simultaneously excludes 
the poorest from consumption. Given that the user fee is insufficient to eliminate the 
excess demand for the social good completely, it is assumed that applicants are then 
rationed by non-price allocation mechanisms. Within our theoretical framework, we 
formally prove the existence of corner and interior solutions. While non-inequity-averse 
entrepreneurs set the user fee such that no further excess demand occurs, highly inequity-
averse entrepreneurs allocate the social good for free and rely exclusively on non-price 
rationing instruments. In contrast, given moderate inequity aversion, individuals are 
rationed by both user fees and non-price instruments. Moreover, we find ambiguous 
reactions of the entrepreneur to a cut in donations. Given a sufficiently low level of status-
quo donations, entrepreneurs with relatively high inequity aversion tend to increase the 
project volume, in contrast to entrepreneurs with relatively low aversion. 
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In the second model, we modify two assumptions and study the implications for the 
entrepreneur. First, the entrepreneur not only decides on the quantity and poverty 
composition of recipients but now also on the quality of the social good. Second, it is 
assumed that the entrepreneur perfectly price discriminates recipients. As a consequence, 
the entrepreneur can provide a good of lower quality to many less poor individuals, but she 
can also supply a good of maximum quality to a small group of the poorest individuals. We 
find that less inequity-averse entrepreneurs prefer to serve wealthier individuals at high 
reference quality. In contrast, more inequity-averse entrepreneurs care for the poorest 
individuals but offer minimum quality. Furthermore, as input costs increase, entrepreneurs 
with low inequity aversion change the target group, while entrepreneurs with high aversion 
do not. Additionally, both models demonstrate that the experimentally revealed motive of 
inequity aversion provides an understanding of how social entrepreneur’s benefit, on the 
one hand, from the quantity and the composition of recipients with regard to their payment 
ability and, on the other hand, from the service quality. 
In chapter 3, we change our perspective and analyze optimal governmental 
intervention in credit markets in the light of market failures. The chapter evaluates federal 
lending programs while presuming positive externalities and symmetrically informed 
market participants. For common objectives of governmental lending institutions we verify 
that optimal lending structures require the application of the gap lender principle. We also 
show that lending programs can never be self-financing, due to the positive subsidy 
margin. Within this general framework, we contrast the policies of the US Small Business 
Administration and the German KfW Mittelstandsbank and show that neither institution 
features an optimal lending structure. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Social entrepreneurship has many facets. Although there exists no standard definition of 
the term, from an economics perspective social entrepreneurship refers to the creation of 
new non- and for-profit businesses, organizations, or movements that aim at correcting 
market failure.1 For example, social entrepreneurs reduce asymmetric information through 
protection of consumers when sellers have advantageous knowledge. They reduce 
monopsonistic power in labour markets by founding trade unions. They provide public 
goods by enforcing human rights, promoting cultural exchange, or shaping political 
systems. They internalize externalities by eliminating or preventing environmental 
damages or by alleviating poverty. The academic literature offers important contributions 
that help to understand the phenomenon of social entrepreneurship. First, the 
entrepreneurship literature provides a characterization of the social entrepreneur by 
pinpointing necessary capabilities and activities. For example, the ideal entrepreneur is 
able to handle the complexity of social problems, to erect networks through credibility, and 
to generate followers’ commitment to the project. Additionally, the entrepreneur identifies 
social opportunities, recruits and motivates others, secures the resources that are needed, 
and overcomes obstacles and challenges.2 Furthermore, the literature proposes tools and 
guidelines for entrepreneurial analysis and decision making.3  
Second, the field of public economics deals with the private provision of public goods. 
Much attention has been devoted to characterizing donor preferences that theoretically 
explain why individuals voluntarily contribute to public goods and, hence, why the free-
riding problem is of limited empirical significance. The most prominent among these 
preferences are altruism, warm glow, and prestige.4  
Third, the literature on industrial organization analyzes observable and optimal 
behaviour of nonprofit firms in many activities. These include fundraising, generating 
mission unrelated revenues, pricing, and rationing of needy individuals, to name a few.5  
                                                 
1 This definition partly reflects statements of Haugh (2005) and Austin et al. (2006). 
2 Compare Waddock and Post (1991), Borins (2000), Thompson et al. (2000), and Thompson (2002). 
3 Compare Dees et al. (2001, 2002), Austin et al. (2006), and Weerawardena and Mort (2006). 
4 Seminal work in this field has been done by Bergstrom et al. (1986), Andreoni (1990), and Harbaugh 
(1998). 
5 For classic contributions compare Newhouse (1970), Hansmann (1980), Rose-Ackerman (1982), and 
Weisbrod (1998b). 
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In this section we argue that, despite the huge body of literature, there exists a gap in 
explaining social entrepreneurial decision making in the context of poverty alleviation. 
Specifically, it is not yet fully understood by what objectives the social entrepreneur’s 
allocation of external funds is governed. We begin our analysis by illustrating the 
magnitude of poverty. We then characterize the nonprofit sector, identify our research 
questions, survey the related literature, and propose a theoretical framework that features 
inequity aversion as the key motivation of social entrepreneurs. 
Poverty is one of today’s most pressing social problems. It constitutes a market failure 
since altruistic individuals experience a disutility from low consumption levels of poor 
people.6 The redistribution of funds from altruistic to poor individuals internalizes positive 
externalities of consumption and, consequently, achieves Pareto optimality. As an 
indication of the societal significance of poverty, Mohammad Yunus, who many consider 
to be the ideal social entrepreneur,7 was awarded the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize for supplying 
micro credit to poor people in Bangladesh.  
The significance of poverty is also confirmed by empirical studies that quantify the 
number of poor people in different geographical regions. However, the findings depend 
crucially on the applied poverty line, for which there is no internationally agreed standard. 
For example, figure 2.1 shows the results found by Chen and Ravallion (2008). They 
applied four day-income levels and quantified the percentage of people in the developing 
world who live below a specific line, subdivided by continents. Accordingly, if people are 
considered poor who live below $2.508 a day, then more than 80 percent of the population 
in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa qualify for this status.  
Poverty is even prevalent in industrialized countries. For its quantification, however, 
much higher poverty lines are applied. For example, in Germany approximately 15 percent 
of the population earned less than 60 percent of the median income in 2007 and were, 
hence, considered to be endangered by poverty.9 A different poverty measure is used in the 
United States. The United States Census Bureau publishes yearly poverty thresholds whose 
determinants include the size of family and number of related children under 18 years. For 
                                                 
6 This definition is based on Hochman and Rodgers (1969). 
7 See, for example, Bornstein (2004) and Martin and Osberg (2007). 
8 The dollar values are based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). 
9 See Statistisches Bundesamt (2009). 
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Figure 2.1: Percent of population in developing countries living below $1.00-$2.50 a day in 200510 
 
example, in 2008 this level amounted to $21,834 for a family of two adults and two 
children.11 The official poverty rate, i.e. the fraction of people living below the threshold 
levels, amounted to 13.2 percent.12 The data clarify that income inequality is not only a 
problem in the developing world but also in industrialized countries. 
Neither is the prevalence of poverty a new phenomenon, nor the privately taken 
measures against it. Over the past centuries, individuals worldwide have perceived ideas of 
poverty alleviation by creating nonprofit organizations. Bornstein (2004) argues that St. 
Francis of Assisi, who founded the Franciscan Order in 1209, can be considered the first 
social entrepreneur. Since then, the magnitude of the nonprofit sector has continuously 
increased, with an acceleration over the last decades. In 1929, the sector accounted for 
approximately 1.2 percent of the US national income, grew to 2.8 percent in 1974,13 and 
contributed 5 percent to GDP in 2006.14 Salamon (1994) argues that a similar development 
has likewise taken place in other industrialized as well as developing countries around the 
globe. 
                                                 
10 Source: Own illustration. 
11 See U.S. Census Bureau (2010). 
12 See DeNavas-Walt et al. (2009). 
13 See Hansmann (1980). 
14 See Wing et al. (2008). 
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In contrast to governments, social entrepreneurs do not directly transfer income from 
wealthy to low income people but allocate specific goods and services that satisfy basic 
human needs or assist poor individuals to overcome poverty on their own. Related to the 
satisfaction of basic human needs are organizations that provide food, clothes, shelter, and 
health services. Additionally, a prominent innovation in this area are micro-insurance 
schemes which cover basic risks of people in developing countries, e.g. death, life-
threatening diseases, accidents, or natural disasters. Products that enable poor individuals 
to self-improve their financial situation are, for example, education, training, and 
microcredit. Education or vocational training increase people’s knowledge and skills and, 
thus, enhance their chances of (higher paid) employment. Microcredit institutions lend 
small loans15 primarily to poor individuals that start or already run their own business.  
Social entrepreneurs cover the costs of producing such goods and services through 
different sources of finance. Combining the categories identified by Weisbrod (1998a) and 
Boris and Steuerle (2006) yields the following distinction: Philanthropy (donations and 
voluntary work), government grants, user fees, investment income, and mission unrelated 
revenues (income from for-profit activities in other markets). The relevance of each type of 
income differs between countries and branches. Figure 2.2 shows an international 
comparison of nonprofit financing between 18 countries.16 Accordingly, financing by fees 
(including mission unrelated revenues and investment income) predominates in Mexico 
(85%). In contrast, the highest fraction of governmental grants is found in Ireland (78%) 
and philanthropy represents the largest proportion in Romania (36%). There exist diverse 
explanations for these observations. Salamon and Anheier (1996) argue that private 
donations are negatively correlated to national tax rates and that public spending is partly 
historically conditioned. They also assume that in countries where governmental support is 
relatively low, nonprofits are forced to generate income from other sources, thus implying 
                                                 
15 According to Grameen Bank (2008), the institution provided an average micro-enterprise loan of $348.93 
in 2008.  
16 The data, taken from Salamon and Anheier (1999), do not include voluntary work. An inclusion would 
increase the overall fraction of philanthropy to 27 percent and decrease the proportions of fees and 
governmental spending to 39 and 34 percent, respectively.    
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a higher fraction of fees and philanthropy.17 However, empirical evidence from cross-
sectoral studies shows mixed results concerning this crowding-out theory.18  
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Figure 2.2: Sources of nonprofit income in 1995, by country19 
 
Additionally, Salamon and Anheier (1996) examine income structures of different 
fields of the nonprofit sector. Figure 2.3 depicts the results for ten types of nonprofit 
activities accross seven countries (France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, U.K., USA). 
The comparison shows that fees cover the largest part of costs in business and professional 
associations (92%). The largest proportion of public spending is observed with health 
organizations (59%) and the fraction of philanthropy is highest in the field of international 
development (38%). The figure illustrates that government grants and philanthropy are a 
major source of finance for organizations that operate in the fields of international 
development, health, social services, and education. Especially in such fields, a significant 
fraction of goods and services are designed to alleviate poverty. As an immediate 
                                                 
17 See Salamon and Anheier (1999). 
18 In contrast to Kingma (1989), both Khanna et al. (1995) and Okten and Weisbrod (2000) do not find 
evidence that government grants crowd out donations. Instead, there exist positive effects in some industries. 
Furthermore, they find no significant correlation between program service revenues (fees) and donations.  
19 Source: Own illustration. 
SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS 
 
11
consequence, the low payment ability of the targeted poor individuals restricts nonprofit 
organizations in charging prices and, thus, might explain the low share of fees.20 
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Figure 2.3: Sources of nonprofit income in 1995, by field (7 countries)21 
 
Although social entrepreneurs obtain income from various sources, frequently, its total 
level is insufficient to serve all needy individuals at the desired level. As an indication, a 
survey on 971 New York food pantries shows that in 1998 34 percent of the pantries were 
unable to provide all applicants.22 In such cases, the entrepreneur generally has to choose 
from two types of rationing: The partial rationing of recipients or the denial of access to 
some applicants. 
Steinberg and Weisbrod (1998) highlight a number of rationing instruments that help 
the entrepreneur achieve the desired allocation: fees, waiting lists, physical queues, 
location, eligibility requirements, quality dilution, product bundling, and noncash 
payments. With regard to poverty reduction, each of the instruments shows distinct 
benefits and disadvantages. For instance, while user fees exclude individuals with 
insufficient payment ability, they increase the entrepreneur’s income and enable her to 
serve more needy, although less poor, individuals. In contrast, rationing by waiting benefits 
the poorest applicants, because their opportunity costs of waiting are lowest, hence 
inducing them to queue first. However, the recipient’s utility of the service can be reduced 
by the waiting time. As an extreme example, the postponement of a surgery may lead to 
                                                 
20 Salamon and Anheier (1996) provide a similar explanation.  
21 Source: Own illustration. 
22 See Food for Survival (2000). 
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long-term damage or even death.23 Theoretically, waiting time identifies the poorest people 
indirectly through self-selection. A similar effect occurs with the choice of location. By 
offering social goods and services in geographic areas where the most needy individuals 
reside, the entrepreneur minimizes their purchasing costs while enhancing the costs for less 
needy people outside this area. The use of the instrument is limited by the availability of 
information about the geographic distribution of incomes.24 In contrast, a direct 
identification of targeted individuals is obtained by the formulation of eligibility 
requirements, e.g. employment status, income, age, family size, gender, religion, etc. 
However, the applicable mix of criteria and, thus, the targeting success crucially depends 
on the quantifiability and verification costs of necessary data.  
Quality dilution represents a further option for rationing. It reduces the marginal costs 
of production and, given a constant budget, increases the number of served individuals. 
Simultaneously, the reduction of the product’s quality rations recipients partially since 
their need-satisfaction level decreases. Alternatively, the entrepreneur could apply noncash 
payments or product bundling. Both instruments impose additional requirements on the 
recipient in form of either contributing to the production process (e.g. labour) or 
purchasing a further good or service. For example, homeless shelters typically offer 
additional psychological or addiction counselling.  
Social entrepreneurs frequently combine the characterized instruments. Food for 
Survival (2000) reports that New York soup kitchens and food pantries ration applicants 
through waiting lines and eligibility criteria. Additionally, they bundle their offers with a 
selection from 28 non-food services like after school programs, budget and credit 
counselling, job training, or shelter. Social entrepreneurs also price or quality discriminate 
recipients with regard to specific eligibility criteria. According to the Grameen Bank 
(2008), the institution imposes an interest rate of twenty percent on self-employed 
individuals, students pay five percent, and beggars borrow with zero interest. Furthermore, 
there is evidence that US nonprofit hospitals differentiate the quality (i.e. service intensity) 
between patient groups.25  
                                                 
23 Nichols et al. (1971), Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984), and in a later version Cullis and Jones (1986) 
provide theoretical analyses of the effects of rationing by waiting. 
24 FAO (2001) discusses practices of geographic targeting in developing countries. 
25 See Friesner and Rosenman (2004). 
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Moreover, the choice of rationing instruments and their application intensity often 
differ between social entrepreneurs, even though they operate in the same branch and in 
the same region. In Germany, food pantries typically allocate their products through 
applying a mix of user fees and poverty criteria. Rohrmann (2009) reports that the fraction 
of pantries which formulate eligibility requirements varied between 76.2 percent (2002) 
and 96 percent (2007). User fees were charged by 65 percent (2002) and 89 percent (2007) 
of the organizations and differed between 0.50 and 2 Euro per food ration. Theoretically, 
differences in rationing practices cause different allocations of food, i.e. compositions of 
recipients. One can expect that pantries that do not charge user fees and demand income 
verification sheets serve a poorer group of recipients on average than organizations that do 
not apply eligibility requirements but charge a fee.  
Even the rationing of needy individuals through quality dilution is subject to large 
variations: The provision of shelter ranges from a low-quality emergency stay to a long-
term accommodation at market standard; food is supplied on a nonprofit basis by soup 
kitchens as well as higher quality university cafeterias. Frequently, the choice of quality 
level follows a specific pattern related to the income of the target group: The good or 
service provided to the poorest is of significantly lower quality than comparable market 
offers. According to the World Bank (2003), in low- and middle-income countries services 
for poor people are often of low quality characterized by inadequately skilled workers, 
lacking resources, facilities in disrepair etc. More specifically, for micro-insurance 
schemes addressing the poor in developing countries, a survey by McCord (2001) shows 
that these insurances’ coverage of health risks is very limited.26 Similar findings are 
reported for food assistance programs which often supply low-quality food.27  
These observations lead to the following questions: First, why do social entrepreneurs 
differ in their choice and application intensity of rationing instruments although they 
operate within the same social branch? More specifically, with regard to poverty 
alleviation it is particularly interesting to understand why, as in the case of the German 
food pantries, some entrepreneurs charge user fees and exclude the poorest applicants 
                                                 
26 The study pinpoints major exclusions and limitations in the coverage of micro-insurance schemes. 
Moreover, most of the schemes operate with reimbursement limitations. 
27 Food for Survival (2000) found that the majority of the analysed 971 New York soup kitchens and food 
pantries offer food that consists of cheap non-perishable goods (rice, pasta, beans, powdered milk, canned 
foods etc.) while the supply of fresh food is relatively rare.  
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while others allocate their goods and services for free and ration applicants exclusively 
through non-price instruments. Second, why do social entrepreneurs provide the poorest 
individuals with products of relatively low quality? Why do they not alternatively use 
available income (e.g. donations, grants, or mission unrelated revenues) to lift the product 
quality to market level at the cost of a lower quantity of recipients?  
This chapter addresses both issues by proposing two positive models of social 
entrepreneurial rationing behavior. For both models, it is assumed that a social 
entrepreneur discovers a group of individuals who are unable to satisfy a specific basic 
human need due to their insufficient incomes. The entrepreneur plans to start a nonprofit 
organization that allocates a need-oriented good. In this context, we examine the conditions 
of nonprofit allocation patterns. Specifically, the first model (section 2.2) focuses on the 
entrepreneur’s decision on how much to charge for the social good. It is assumed that the 
price is set uniformly across recipients and the quality of the social good is exogenously 
given. Furthermore, we assume that individuals vary in poverty, i.e., they feature different 
abilities to pay for the social good. Hence, pricing involves the following trade-off: The 
higher the fee paid by the recipient, the more people in need can be served by the 
additional revenues. But charging a fee means simultaneously to exclude the very poor 
from consumption. Since exogenous funds of the entrepreneur are considered limited, the 
model additionally accounts for the possibility of excess demand for the provided good, 
and it is assumed that, in this case, applicants are rationed by non-price allocation 
mechanisms, e.g. eligibility criteria or waiting time. 
The second model (section 2.3) relaxes two assumptions. It is now assumed that the 
entrepreneur also chooses the quality level of the social good and perfectly price 
discriminates individuals. Thus, any allocation is characterized not only by the 
composition of served individuals according to their income and the quantity of recipients, 
as in the first model, but also by the quality of the social good. These three dimensions are 
interrelated due to the constant third-party funds: For example, the higher the quality of the 
social good, the lower the quantity of served individuals or, alternatively, the richer the 
recipients. 
As indicated in the outline of the models, the analysis of this chapter is constrained to 
nonprofit entrepreneurship and, hence, excludes entrepreneurs that may pursue social goals 
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but also earn profits in the long run. This restriction reflects the limited ability of for-profit 
social ventures to alleviate poverty: Given that the payment ability of individuals for a 
specific social good is lower than the marginal costs of producing it, their provision 
requires third-party funds. However, as Hansmann (1980) indicates, social ventures with 
for-profit status are unlikely to obtain donations because, in contrast to nonprofit 
organizations, they are not subject to the non-distribution constraint, which prohibits 
entrepreneurs to extract any organizational income for private purpose and, thus, provides 
donors with a credible signal that funds are used according to the social mission. 
Consequently, without this constraint, the for-profit social venture is unable to attract 
donations and is, hence, limited in subsidizing and serving the poorest individuals. 
As a further restriction, it is assumed that third-party funds are exogenously given. In 
other words, donors, volunteers, or governments do not exert any influence on the social 
entrepreneur’s allocation by making their contributions conditional on specific properties 
of the allocation. The purpose of this dissertation is only to model and analyze the basic 
patterns of the allocation behavior of social entrepreneurs. In a next step, this model might 
be augmented by a principal-agent approach, which considers the influence of a lead 
donor28 or a government. This extension, however, is left for future research. Nevertheless, 
the effects of an exogenous variation in donations are analyzed separately in each model of 
chapter 2. Additionally, the analysis excludes entrepreneurial decisions on the generation 
of investment income and mission unrelated revenues. Since the maximization calculus of 
such revenues is independent of their allocation to needy individuals, it is, therefore, 
assumed that they have been optimized ex-ante. For reasons of simplicity, in the following, 
the term donations also includes government grants, investment income, and mission 
unrelated revenues.  
In contrast to the previous assumptions, user fees, as the final revenue source for 
nonprofit entrepreneurs, are differently considered in this chapter. In section 2.2 we 
assume uniform pricing, whereas the social entrepreneur perfectly price discriminates 
individuals in section 2.3. Both types of pricing are empirically observable: Typically, 
soup kitchens, charity shops, or homeless shelters offer their goods or services at uniform 
                                                 
28 Lead donors typically grant a significant, often the largest, part of the initial financial need of social 
entrepreneurs. Theoretical analyses of lead donors can be found in Andreoni (1998, 2006). 
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user fees. Especially in such cases, a detection of reservation prices is prohibitively costly 
because low-involvement products are sold to a large number of individuals, which 
excludes price discrimination from further consideration. On the other hand, given that the 
identification costs of reservation prices are sufficiently low, nonprofits are able to charge 
sliding-scale fees for different users. Hansmann (1980) as well as Steinberg and Weisbrod 
(1998) provide numerous examples of such practices, e.g. day care, mental health care, or 
church membership. Furthermore, in favor of price discrimination, Steinberg and Weisbrod 
(2005) argue that it is more likely that individuals are willing to reveal their willingness to 
pay to nonprofit than to for-profit organizations.  
After having characterized the basic assumptions concerning the entrepreneurial 
allocation of external funds, the social entrepreneur’s objectives remain to be specified. A 
survey of the corresponding literature reveals several attempts to characterize the goals of 
nonprofits which are relevant to the entrepreneurial trade-off between the quantity and the 
composition of recipients. For example, Steinberg and Weisbrod (2005) characterize 
pricing and rationing decisions of nonprofit organizations that seek to maximize the 
weighted sum of the consumers’ surpluses. In their model they allow for price 
discrimination and analyze equilibrium prices in comparison to marginal costs and 
reservation prices. A similar utility function is used by Feldstein (1972). However, the 
proposed objectives are inappropriate to analyze the alleviation of poverty or, in other 
words, the satisfaction of basic human needs, which social entrepreneurs typically consider 
strongly. Economic theory suggests that individuals satisfy those needs first, provided their 
budget is sufficiently large. Different reservation prices, as a part of consumer surplus, 
thus, generally point to different incomes and not to differently intense preferences. It is 
straight forward to conclude that a given user fee results in a higher surplus for wealthier 
recipients. Although the nonprofit organization, as analyzed in Steinberg and Weisbrod 
(2005), might weight wealthier consumers less than poorer, it is unclear why it should 
consider consumer surplus at all, since this is an inadequate proxy for consumer utility in 
contexts of poverty. In the extreme case, the provision of individuals without any liquidity 
to bid for the good or service does not help to fulfill the firm’s goal even if the good is 
allocated to them costlessly. Consequently, they are served last, if at all. 
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In addition to Steinberg and Weisbrod (2005), there are various other attempts to 
characterize the objectives of social entrepreneurs and nonprofit organizations, ranging 
from the maximization of service, budget, and usage to the maximization of the number of 
users (Steinberg, 1986; Brooks, 2005; Ansari et al., 1996). All these approaches describe a 
social entrepreneur who extends the project size by charging recipients a fee. However, 
they do not explain why organizations charge no user fee but simultaneously face 
congestion.29 
Furthermore, there exist three different approaches to implement service quality and 
quantity into the objective function of private nonprofit decision makers. Newhouse (1970) 
and Rose-Ackerman (1987) follow the established convention that indifference curves 
between both variables have the “usual” convex shape. Along a second line, Dor and 
Farley (1996) as well as Friesner and Rosenman (2004) argue in favor of service intensity-
adjusted output, where quality (characterized by service intensity) and quantity are 
multiplicably dependent within the nonprofit’s utility function. A third specification is 
given by Blau and Mocan (2002), who apply a Cobb-Douglas objective function in a child-
care setting. However, all approaches lack a profound motivation for the specific 
interaction of quality and quantity within the decision maker’s utility function. 
Specifically, the intuition of the assumed dependency between the marginal utility of 
service quality and the absolute level of provided quantity remains unclear. 
In this chapter we fill the gap of an adequate utility function by assuming that social 
entrepreneurs are inequity averse in making their decisions. Specifically, the entrepreneur 
draws negative utility from a deviation of an individual’s consumption possibilities from a 
social reference level. By providing needy individuals with the social good she reduces the 
inequity and, hence, her own disutility. Our approach thereby builds on recent 
experimental economic research which investigates general social preferences by means of 
simple distribution games, e.g. dictator and ultimatum games, where one individual 
decides on the distribution of an exogenously given amount of money between herself and 
other players. In their seminal work Fehr and Schmidt (1999) as well as Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) analyze the results of several experiments and conclude that the inequity-
                                                 
29 In 1998, all 971 New York food pantries analyzed by Food for Survival (2000) charged no user fees, 
although 34 percent of the pantries had to turn people away. 
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aversion motive is able to explain the observed behavior. Exemplarily, Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) provide the following definition: “Inequity aversion means that people resist 
inequitable outcomes; i.e., they are willing to give up some material payoff to move in the 
direction of more equitable outcomes.”  
We apply this motive to our models of social entrepreneurship for two reasons. First, 
the analyzed distribution games are closely related to the decision context of the social 
entrepreneur in that an exogenously given amount of third-party funds has to be allocated 
between different individuals.30 Second, given that the principle of inequity aversion 
constitutes a building block in understanding the general fairness preferences of 
individuals, we can expect it to characterize the motivation of social entrepreneurs, in 
particular these, whose raison d’être lies in the alleviation of poverty, i.e. mitigation of 
existing inequitable allocations. However, we prefer a broader definition of inequity 
aversion than Fehr and Schmidt (1999), who model the preferences of the distributor as 
self-centered inequity aversion, meaning that she cares about her own payoff relative to the 
payoff of others. In contrast, we do not restrict the reference outcome to be the 
entrepreneurs own consumption set but also allow for alternative reference levels, e.g. 
societal standards. 
The results of chapter 2 are as follows. It is shown that the inequity-aversion motive 
provides a clear understanding of how nonprofits benefit from the quantity and the 
composition of recipients with regard to their initial consumption endowment, and, in the 
second model, additionally from service quality. Furthermore, we prove the existence of 
corner and interior utility maxima which explain various empirically observable 
allocations. Specifically, given a constant quality of the social good in section 2.2, highly 
inequity averse entrepreneurs charge no user fees and ration applicants exclusively by non-
price allocation mechanisms. In contrast, entrepreneurs with no aversion charge a 
maximum user fee (no excess demand occurs) and moderately averse entrepreneurs apply 
both user fees and non-price rationing instruments. Moreover, we find three 
entrepreneurial reactions to an increase of third-party funds. First, there is a particular level 
of inequity aversion at which user-fee revenues are reduced to exactly the same amount by 
                                                 
30 Although we do not account for efficiency concerns in our model, the distribution game closest to our 
model specification is analyzed as treatment R in Engelmann and Strobel (2004). Here, the decision maker is 
the wealthiest individual and is likewise not able to extract any rents for herself.  
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which third-party funds are increased. Hence, the project volume remains unchanged. In 
contrast, entrepreneurs with a higher poverty aversion react with a reduction of the project 
volume and entrepreneurs with a lower aversion widen the scope of their service.  
Moreover, we show in section 2.3 that target-group and quality patterns, which 
correspond to the empirical observations mentioned above, can be explained. First, we find 
that highly inequity-averse entrepreneurs provide the poorest individuals at minimum 
quality. To date, existing explanations for the low quality of services to the very poor were 
limited to the role of governmental provision. For example, Glazer and Niskanen (1997) 
highlight the importance of a poor majority in a public choice setting while Besley and 
Coate (1991) study governmental measures for redistributing income from the rich to the 
poor. However, due to the inability of raising taxes, these approaches are inadequate to 
explain private nonprofit behavior. As a second pattern, we find that weakly inequity-
averse entrepreneurs choose to serve the least needy individuals at social reference quality, 
i.e. maximum quality. Allocations between both extremes occur only for entrepreneurs 
with moderate aversion. Furthermore, we show that, as input costs increase, entrepreneurs 
with low inequity aversion change the target group, while entrepreneurs with high aversion 
do not. 
Chapter 2 is organized as follows. In section 2.2.1 we introduce the first model of the 
entrepreneur’s allocation decision which accounts for uniform pricing and a constant 
quality of the social good. In section 2.2.2 we provide optimality conditions and formally 
prove the existence of corner solutions (with either maximum or no user fee) and interior 
utility maxima implying rationing by both user fees and non-price instruments. Section 
2.2.3 analyzes a variation in third-party funds. We conclude in section 2.2.4 with a 
discussion of the model’s results. The second model of chapter 2 is introduced in section 
2.3.1. It accounts for perfectly discriminated user fees and a variable quality of the social 
good. Section 2.3.2 analyzes how a variation in donations and input costs impacts the 
rationing behavior of nonprofits. Again, we conclude in section 2.3.3 with a discussion of 
these results. Finally, section 2.4 highlights implications for future research in the field of 
social entrepreneurship. 
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2.2 RATIONING BY UNIFORM USER FEES AND NON-PRICE ALLOCATION 
INSTRUMENTS31 
2.2.1 THE MODEL 
Consider a group of individuals unable to satisfy a specific basic human need due to their 
insufficient incomes. An inequity-averse entrepreneur discovers the deficit and plans to 
allocate a social good of fixed quality on a nonprofit basis. The constant marginal costs of 
producing the good are ∗+∈Rc . They must be covered by the entrepreneur’s income, which 
might include government grants, private donations or mission unrelated business incomes. 
We simply subsume those funds under donations +∈RD  and assume that their total level 
is exogenously given. In case this level is insufficient to serve all individuals, there is a 
need to ration applicants. We model two rationing instruments: a uniform user fee as the 
entrepreneur’s decision variable and a non-price allocation mechanism which is 
automatically applied if further rationing arises. The uniform user fee f , with 
[ ] +⊂∈ Rf,f max0  and cfmax > , mitigates excess demand by excluding individuals with 
lower reservation prices and enlarging the entrepreneur’s budget. The non-price rationing 
instrument helps the entrepreneur to identify and directly serve only the poorest individuals 
with the ability to pay the fee. 
We do not consider price discrimination for a number of reasons. There are many 
examples of social businesses typically offering their good at a uniform price. One might 
hypothesize that those enterprises principally sell low-involvement products to a large 
number of individuals, such as food providing services or charity shops. Since here a 
detection of each applicant’s income, or rather reservation price, is prohibitively costly, 
price discrimination is infeasible. Even in cases where several income classes can be 
defined and different user fees are charged, a further segmentation of heterogeneous 
subgroups may be desirable but not possible. For example, the allocation of food in a 
university cafeteria is accompanied by a differentiation of prices between students, 
members of the university and external visitors. Examination of eligibility is done by 
student identity cards and service cards. Although students differ in their wealth and poorer 
                                                 
31 With little modification, this section is taken from Starke (2010). 
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students should be subsidized more, a further segmentation according to income would be 
too costly. In those cases, other rationing instruments, which implicitly allocate the good to 
the poorest applicants, like queues, are implemented. A perceptible simplification of the 
model constitutes another reason for analyzing uniform user fees. Subsequently, we argue 
that all derived results can be likewise shown with a consideration of price discrimination. 
The demand for the good is given by ( )fn , with [ ] +→ R,fn max0: , ( ) 0=maxfn , 
( ) 1≥cn ,32 ( ) ∞<0n , ( ) 0: <′= fnn f  and ( ) 0: >′′= fnn ff . It is important to note that 
reservation prices are uniquely determined by the individual’s ability to pay. 
Microeconomic theory suggests that a low reservation price is the result of a low income or 
a weak preference for the good. In contrast, a prerequisite for high reservation prices is a 
sufficiently large income. However, when basic human needs are concerned, we can 
assume that individuals will satisfy these first. As a consequence, low reservation fees 
result from limited payment abilities. Although there might be deviations from this 
suggested behavior, we postulate a strictly positive correlation between income and 
payment willingness for the good. The resulting demand curve, therefore, presumes 
equally intense consumption preferences across all individuals and solely reflects the 
wealth of applicants. 
We further assume that each applicant intends to consume exactly one unit of the good 
and that each ( )[ ]00 n,n∈  indexes one individual with a specific disposable income. 
According to the previous argumentation, the index is negatively correlated to the 
individual’s reservation fee and wealth, respectively. In other words, the higher the index 
n  is, the lower is the individual’s income. In particular, the individual 0=n  is able to pay 
the prohibitive price maxf  whereas the poorest individual ( )0nn =  cannot afford to pay 
anything. At the same time, a specific element n  likewise denotes the total quantity of 
individuals with a higher income than n . Hence, the term ( )fn  provides two important 
details. It shows the quantity of applicants for the good at a given user fee, and it 
simultaneously indexes the poorest individual being even able to afford this fee.  
                                                 
32 The assumption ( ) 1≥cn  simplifies subsequent proofs w.l.o.g.. 
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The social entrepreneur’s non-price rationing instrument ensures that only the poorest 
applicants out of the quantity ( )fn  receive a unit of the good. This requires a direct or 
indirect detection of reservation prices. Given that the entrepreneur can directly observe 
reservation prices,33 she can formulate adequate eligibility criteria and directly exclude 
wealthier applicants.34 Even in cases in which the entrepreneur cannot observe them, 
theory suggests that there are ways to indirectly exclude the wealthiest applicants, e.g. 
rationing by waiting.35 Therefore, we forego an explicit modeling of direct and indirect 
non-price allocation mechanisms by assuming that the entrepreneur has a general non-price 
tool at hand, which ensures the provision of the poorest applicants. The quantity of the 
wealthiest individuals being excluded from consumption is denoted by ( )fn , with 
( )[ ]fn,n 0∈ . This term likewise denotes the recipient with the highest income. The 
combined application of both rationing instruments determines the final quantity of 
recipients which is given by ( ) ( )fnfn − . 
In allocating the good to the needy, the social entrepreneur is restricted by a nonprofit-
condition. With ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]fnfnffF −⋅=  as total user-fee receipts, the constraint is given 
by  
(2.1) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]fnfncDfF −⋅=+ .  
The nonprofit-condition requires the social entrepreneur to spend her total revenues 
completely on the supply of the good. By rearranging equation (2.1), one obtains 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]fcDfnfn −−= , which shows the endogenous determination of the wealthiest 
recipient for a given fee f . With the poorest individual able to afford the user fee given by 
( )fn , a total of ( ) ( )fnfn −  recipients can be served when the entire donations D  are 
spent to finance the gap between marginal costs and individual contribution ( fc − ).  
                                                 
33 Steinberg and Weisbrod (2005) give several arguments in favor of this assumption.  
34 Although such practices are supposed to cause so-called targeting costs, we simplify by ignoring them for 
the following reason: These costs mainly arise due to the identification of suitable income indicators and the 
screening of individuals. However, since the social entrepreneur must screen all applicants to detect the 
targeted individuals, targeting costs are independent of the quantity and composition of recipients. Hence, 
they are fixed costs that simply reduce the amount of donations. A variation in donations is analyzed in 
section 2.2.3. 
35 Nichols et al. (1971), Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) and in a later version Cullis and Jones (1986) 
provide theoretical analyses of the effects of rationing by waiting. 
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Figure 2.4 summarizes the impact of the entrepreneur’s rationing mechanisms on the 
market. In panel (a) the entrepreneur allocates the good for free. All considered individuals 
are willing to purchase the good but, due to the limited donations, only the fraction 
( ) ( )00 nn −  is served and the wealthiest ( )0n  individuals are rationed by the non-price 
instrument. Since the entrepreneur’s budget is not enlarged by additional user-fee 
revenues, the project shows the lowest possible volume. Panel (b) considers the combined 
use of both rationing instruments. The entrepreneur chooses the user fee 1f  which rations 
the poorest ( ) ( )10 fnn −   applicants who are unable to afford the good. Although this fee 
increases total revenues at first, the budget remains insufficient to provide all applying 
individuals ( )[ ] ( )( )11 fncDfF <+ . Consequently, the entrepreneur excludes the 
wealthiest ( )1fn  applicants by use of the non-price mechanism. In contrast, panel (c) 
considers the exclusive supply of the most solvent individuals. The entrepreneur chooses 
the user fee which maximizes her total revenues, subject to the nonprofit-condition. This 
ensures that the maximum quantity of applicants is served. 
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(a)                                                       (b)                                                       (c) 
Figure 2.4: The allocative outcome of rationing by user fees and the non-price instrument. 
 
An additional effect of the nonprofit-constraint is the unique relationship between the 
user fee and total user-fee revenues. Inserting ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]fnfnffF −⋅=  into equation (2.1) 
yields 
(2.2) ( )
fc
DffF −
⋅= . 
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According to this equation, the entrepreneur’s choice of f  determines her total receipts 
( )fF . Subsequently, we take advantage of this relationship and reverse it. We characterize 
the social entrepreneur’s choice in terms of F  instead of the individual fee. At a later 
stage, this allows for a direct derivation of the project size DF +  and, therefore, simplifies 
the analysis. Rearranging equation (2.2) yields the implicit function  
(2.3) ( )
DF
FcF +
⋅=f  , 
with  
( ) ( ) 0: 2 >+
⋅=′=
DF
DcFF ff   
and  
( ) ( ) 0
2: 3 <+
⋅⋅−=′′=
DF
DcFFF ff . 
Employing equation (2.3) into the demand function yields  
(2.4) ( )( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+
⋅=
DF
FcnFn f  , 
with  
(2.5) ( )( ) 0: <⋅=′= F fF nFnn ff   
and  
(2.6) ( )( ) 0: 2 >⋅+⋅=′′= FF fF ffFF nnFnn fff . 
As indicated in the introduction, the social entrepreneur is characterized as an inequity-
averse person. In this model it suffices to assume that she values the provision to an 
individual higher, the poorer the person is. This simplification is possible since, due to the 
constant quality of the social good, the fraction of donations that is allocated to a given 
recipient is also fixed. Hence, the entrepreneur chooses from allocations that only differ in 
the composition and quantity of served individuals. For reasons of tractability, in the 
following, we term this simplified preference form poverty aversion to abstract from the 
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more complex specification of inequity aversion used in section 2.3. The most similar 
characterization to our notion of poverty aversion is given by Nichols et al. (1971, p. 316), 
who claim that “[…] the poorer a person is, the more willing the public is to provide him 
[…]”. 
Specifically, the entrepreneur draws a nonnegative level of utility from each allocated 
unit of the good to a target-group individual, which is characterized by the value function  
(2.7) ( ) αnnu = . 
Here, the parameter +∈Rα  determines the constant elasticity of marginal utility 
1−=αε 36 and is likewise a measure for the curvature of the value function. Marginal 
utility is decreasing with ( )10  ,∈α , constant with 1=α , and increasing with .1>α  As 
with the class of Cobb-Douglas utility functions, α  characterizes the entrepreneur’s 
preference intensity for recipients with different incomes and will be subsequently 
interpreted as the entrepreneurial poverty aversion. Specifically, for 0=α  the entrepreneur 
shows no aversion and values the service of each individual the same.37 However, given a 
positive level of poverty aversion ( )0>α , the entrepreneur obtains a utility surplus from 
substituting the provision of a lower-income for a higher-income individual. This surplus 
increases as α  grows and becomes infinite with ∞→α . As will be shown later, 
entrepreneurs with such extreme aversions are predetermined to serve only the poorest 
target group individuals. 
The entrepreneur maximizes her aggregated utility of served individuals by implicitly 
choosing total user-fee revenues F . According to equation (2.3), this choice uniquely 
correlates to a specific price level for the good ( )( )Ff f= . Individuals who cannot afford 
f  are barred from consumption and, if total revenues are insufficient to serve the 
remaining applicants (i.e. ( ) ( )( )FncDF f<+ ), the non-price allocation instrument is 
implemented to exclude the wealthiest individuals ( )( )Fn f  from consuming the good, 
because they provide the least value to the social entrepreneur. Finally, only the poorest 
                                                 
36 The elasticity of marginal utility is defined as ( ) ( )nu
n
dn
nud
′⋅
′=ε . 
37  With α = 0, the value of serving individual 0=n  is not defined. To simplify this case, we set ( ) 10 =u . 
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applicants with the ability to pay f receive a unit. Consequently, the entrepreneur’s 
maximization problem can be written as38  
(2.8) 
( )
( ) .  cDFnn  .t .s
dnnFU  max
n
nF
+−=
= ∫ α  
By employing the rearranged nonprofit-constraint into the utility function, one obtains the 
following first and second derivative: 
(2.9) ( ) ( ) 01   
c
nnnn
dF
D;FdU
F <=
>⋅+⋅−= ααα    
and 
(2.10) ( ) ( ) 0111 111222   cnncncnnnnnndF D;FUd FFFFF <=
>
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −⋅⋅+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⋅−−⋅⋅+⋅−=
−−− ααααα αα . 
In the next section we prove the possibility of interior utility maxima and corner solutions.  
 
2.2.2 INTERIOR AND CORNER SOLUTIONS 
It is important to keep in mind that the entrepreneur can solely enhance her user-fee 
revenues through an increase of the user-fee level. The unique quantitative relationship 
between both variables is given by equation (2.2). Although, this equation comprises 
additional parameters like the amount of donations or the marginal costs of producing the 
good as well, they are outside the entrepreneur’s scope of influence.  
We define the following terms. The optimal level of user-fee revenues will be denoted 
by ∗F  and the corresponding user fee by ∗f . Furthermore, the maximum user-fee 
revenues will be denoted by maxF  which is achieved if the entrepreneur’s total income 
suffices to serve all applying needy. Consequently, 0=n  and maxF  fulfills the reduced 
nonprofit-condition (2.1), i.e.  
                                                 
38 In the maximization problem and subsequent derivations we simplify the explicit notation ( )( )Fn f  and 
( )( )Fn f  by use of n  and n . 
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(2.11) ( )( )maxmax FncDF f⋅=+ .   
The entrepreneur’s mission is achieved best if all individuals of the target group 
receive one unit of the good. Hence, a costless provision of beneficiaries is required to 
avoid a rationing of the poorest individuals. Consequently, the production costs of serving 
the total target group must be completely covered by donations ( )( )cnD ⋅= 0 . If donations 
are not available ( )0=D , i.e. the applicants’ provision is not externally subsidized, the 
entrepreneur must refrain from the allocation of the good or, alternatively, serve only those 
individuals who can afford a cost covering user fee ( )cf = . The dominance of the second 
option results from value function (2.7). Since any individual of the target group is 
assigned a nonnegative value ( )nu , serving only individuals who can afford the good is 
preferred to non-provision. Total utility (equation (2.8)) is maximized if all applicants who 
show a payment ability of at least marginal production costs c  are served. 
Proposition 2.1. Given 0=D , the entrepreneur charges a cost covering user fee ( )cf =∗  
and serves all needy individuals that can afford to apply, ( )cn .  
Proof. With 0=D , equation (2.3) yields ( ) cF =f . Substituting c  for ( )Ff  in utility 
function (2.8) and differentiating with respect to F  yields ( ) ( ) 010 ≥⋅= cndF ;FdU α . 
Consequently, utility is maximized if all ( )cn  applicants are served. Q.e.d. 
Now, suppose total donations amount to ( )( )cn,D~ ⋅∈ 00 , which suffices to initially 
serve ( )0ncD~ <  applicants. Confronted with the resulting excess demand, the social 
entrepreneur determines her optimal level of user-fee revenues, which, again, is a choice of 
how many individuals are excluded by the user fee and how many are rationed by the non-
price rationing instrument. According to the first derivative (2.9), the increase of user-fee 
receipts F  is accompanied by two effects on the entrepreneur’s utility. First, there is a 
non-positive crowding-out effect ( ) 0≤⋅− Fnnn αα . Let revenues and, equivalently, the 
quantity of recipients be constant, then an increase in user fees cuts off the poorest from 
consumption and shifts the released units of the good to wealthier individuals. This effect 
is utility neutral only if the entrepreneur values all individuals equally. In contrast, given a 
positive level of poverty aversion α , the substitution of wealthier for poorer beneficiaries 
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decreases her utility. The second term of equation (2.9) denotes the nonnegative revenue 
effect ( ) 01 ≥⋅ cnα . The additional user-fee receipts enable the entrepreneur to extend the 
quantity of recipients, which increases her utility. The value of the revenue effect becomes 
zero if all applicants are served.  
Dependent on the entrepreneur’s poverty aversion, both interior and corner solutions 
are possible. If the crowding-out effect dominates the revenue effect for any level of user-
fee revenues, the entrepreneur allocates the good for free ( )0=∗F  and rations applicants 
by the non-price instrument. Intuitively, the higher the poverty aversion is, the less the 
entrepreneur is willing to substitute wealthier for poorer individuals and the sooner she 
foregoes charging a user fee. On the other hand, if the revenue effect exceeds the 
crowding-out effect independent of the level of user-fee receipts, the entrepreneur 
generates maximum revenues ( )maxFF =∗  and serves the maximum quantity of 
beneficiaries. This corner solution arises for a non-poverty averse entrepreneur for whom 
applicants are perfect substitutes. Finally, there are interior utility maxima for moderate 
levels of poverty aversion ( )maxFF << ∗0 . The value of the initially dominant revenue 
effect is offset by the crowding-out effect at some positive level of user-fee revenues and 
overcompensated for higher levels. Consequently, as exemplarily depicted in figure 2.4 
(b), the poorest applicants are rationed by the user fee and the wealthiest applicants are 
excluded by the non-price allocation mechanism. In the next three propositions, we show 
the possibility of interior and corner solutions.   
Proposition 2.2. Given ( )( )00 nc,D ⋅∈ , there exists a finite poverty aversion level α  such 
that for all αα ≥ , 0=∗F .  
Proof. For notational clarity, we temporarily expand the term ( )D;FU  to ( )α,D;FU  to 
emphasize the influence of the entrepreneur’s poverty aversion. Let ( )( )00 nc,D ⋅∈ . Since 
0nF <  and nn > , there exists a finite ( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⋅−≥ nlnnlncnln F
11α  for all 
[ ]maxF,F 0∈  which implies ( ) ( )cnnnn F 1⋅≥⋅−− ααα . Since the revenue effect does not 
exceed the crowding-out effect for all levels of user-fee revenues, an entrepreneur with the 
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poverty aversion level α  chooses 0F =∗ . Since, by definition, ( ) 1≥cn , 
( ) 012 <⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −⋅⋅−⋅⋅=∂∂
∂
c
nnnlnnnnln
F
,D;FU
FF
αα
α
α  and the first derivative (2.9) is 
negative, given [ ]maxF,F 0∈  and αα > . Consequently, 0=∗F . Q.e.d. 
According to proposition 2.2, any social entrepreneur with a level of poverty aversion 
equal or higher than a specific value α  does not wish to charge user fees.39 For those 
entrepreneurs the first derivative of the utility function (equation (2.9)) is non-positive. 
This result is mainly driven by the utility difference between the poorest and the wealthiest 
marginal recipient, which is a component of the crowding-out effect. Since this difference 
increases with the entrepreneur’s poverty aversion, there exists a specific level, above 
which the crowding-out effect dominates the revenue effect for all levels of user-fee 
revenues. Consequently, utility is maximized if the entrepreneur refrains from charging 
user fees and finances its allocation exclusively by donations.  
Proposition 2.3. Given ( )( )00 nc,D ⋅∈ , there exists a positive poverty aversion level 
αα ≤ˆ  such that for all αα ˆ< , 0>∗F .  
Proof. Let ( )( )00 nc,D ⋅∈  and ( ) 011
0
>⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⋅−= =FF
nlnnln
cn
lnαˆ . αα ˆ<  then 
implies ( ) ( )[ ]
0
1 =⋅−−>⋅ FF  nnncn
ααα , which is a necessary condition for the existence 
of a utility maximum with 0>∗F . Q.e.d.40 
                                                 
39 The same results arise with a consideration of price discrimination. Intuitively, since reservation prices, to 
some extent, are lower than marginal costs, recipients must be subsidized by donations or ‘cash cows’ 
(Steinberg and Weisbrod, 2005). If revenues are insufficient to allocate the good to all applicants, the 
entrepreneur must ration them and decide who and how many needy will be served. If she chooses the 
poorest applicants, this requires the highest individual subsidies and benefits the lowest quantity of 
recipients. In contrast, the maximum quantity of recipients follows from serving the wealthiest applicants. It 
is important to note that a change of quantity causes the same qualitative effects on the entrepreneur’s utility: 
a non-positive crowding-out effect and a nonnegative revenue effect. For the same reason, interior and corner 
solutions are possible and depend on the entrepreneur’s level of poverty aversion. 
40 The set [ )αˆ,0  is far from being complete. One can show that there are global utility maxima for higher 
levels of poverty aversion which start with a dominant crowding-out effect for the first unit of user fees 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]
0
1 =′⋅−−≤⋅ F FnnFncn
ααα . The increase of fees initially decreases utility to some minimum 
before the revenue effect overcompensates the utility loss and induces a global maximum. Since all important 
results can be proved without an extension to these special cases, we simplify the analysis by ignoring them. 
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Proposition 2.3 claims that any social entrepreneur with sufficiently low poverty 
aversion chooses a positive level of user fees. Again, consider the entrepreneur’s marginal 
utility (equation (2.9)) for the first unit of user-fee revenues. In line with the intuition of the 
previous proposition, with a poverty aversion below a specific level αˆ  the utility 
difference between the poorest and the wealthiest marginal recipient and, hence, the 
crowding-out effect are sufficiently low. Consequently, the entrepreneur’s marginal utility 
is positive and user fees are charged. 
Proposition 2.4. Given ( )( )00 nc,D ⋅∈ , there exists a strict corner solution with 
maxFF =∗ , if, and only if, 0=α .  
Proof. Consider the first derivative of the utility function (2.9). Let ( )( )00 nc,D ⋅∈  and 
0>α . Since 0>n  and, by definition, 0<Fn , ( ) 0<⋅−→ FFF nnnlimmax αα  and 
( ) 01 =⋅
→
cnlim
maxFF
α . Hence, ( ) 0<
→
dFD;FdUlim
maxFF
 and maxFF <∗ . In contrast, let 0=α . 
Since, ( ) 0=⋅− Fnnn αα  and ( ) 01 ≥⋅ cnα , ( ) 0≥dFD;FdU  for all [ ]maxF,F 0∈  and 
maxFF =∗ . Q.e.d. 
According to proposition 2.4, only non-poverty-averse entrepreneurs choose the corner 
solution with the maximum of user-fee revenues maxF . For a deeper understanding of the 
result consider again the entrepreneur’s marginal utility (equation (2.9)). Given a positive 
level of poverty aversion, the crowding-out effect is strictly negative, since the substitution 
of lower-valued wealthier for higher-valued poorer individuals always entails a loss in 
utility. Concerning the revenue effect, on the other hand, the additional utility the 
entrepreneur gains from enlarging the group of recipients through additional user-fee 
receipts approaches zero since the wealthiest recipient ( )0=n  is of no value to the 
entrepreneur. As a result, there is a level of user-fee revenues at which both effects offset 
each other and, hence, maxFF <∗ . In contrast, non-poverty-averse entrepreneurs assign 
equal value to each individual, which implies that there is no crowding-out effect. The 
marginal utility is characterized by a nonnegative revenue effect implying that the 
maximum user-fee revenues maxF  are chosen. 
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The graphical characterization of propositions 2.2-2.4 is presented in figure 2.5. It 
contrasts total revenues DF + , also considered as project volume, and the entrepreneur’s 
overall utility ( )D;FU . As an important point of reference, the graph ( )D;U 0 , with  
( )
( )
( )
∫
−
=
0
0
0
n
c
Dn
dnnD;U α ,  
( ) ( ) 0010 ≥⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −⋅=
α
c
Dn
cdD
D;dU ,  
and  
( ) ( ) 000 122
2
≤⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −⋅−=
−αα
c
Dn
cdD
D;Ud ,  
denotes the upper utility boundary for any given project volume. It considers utility as a 
pure function of donations D , which implies an allocation of the good free of charge. Its 
concave shape accounts for the impact of the entrepreneur’s non-price rationing instrument 
on the sequence of the applicants’ provision. A poorer individual with a likewise higher 
value is served prior to the next wealthier applicant. The entrepreneur’s marginal utility of 
an additional recipient, therefore, is decreasing. Her aggregated utility reaches a maximum 
if all applicants are served through donations ( )( )cnD ⋅= 0 . 
 
U
( )D;0U
( )0;FU
F,DD~
( )D~;0U
( )D~;FU
∗+ FD~
( )D~;FU ∗
( )( )c0n;0U ⋅
( ) c0n ⋅
( );DFU max
( ) ccn ⋅  
Figure 2.5: A utility function for a moderate level of poverty aversion and the interior optimum. 
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The lower boundary of the utility spectrum is given by ( )0 ;FU , which presumes the 
non-availability of donations. According to equation (2.3), in this case, the social 
entrepreneur chooses a user fee equal to marginal costs and allocates the good to applicants 
successively. The user-fee revenues thereby increase with the quantity of served 
individuals. The corresponding utility function is given by 
( )
( )
( )
∫
−
=
cn
c
Fcn
dnn ;FU α0 , 
with  
( ) ( ) 010 ≥⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −⋅=
α
c
Fcn
cdF
 ;FdU   
and  
( ) ( ) 00 122
2
≤⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −⋅−=
−αα
c
Fcn
cdF
 ;FUd .  
The maximum project size is reached at ( ) ( ) cnccnFmax ⋅<⋅= 0 , i.e. a lower level 
compared to the maximum volume resulting from complete donation financing.  
In figure 2.5, the right increasing dashed graph ( )D;FU max  connects both elements. It 
depicts the entrepreneur’s utility in dependence on the maximum project volume. Since a 
maximum project size implies 0=n , ( )D;FU max  is obtained by rearranging the reduced 
nonprofit-condition (2.11) to ( )( ) ( ) cDFFn maxmax +=f  and inserting it into the utility 
function:  
( )
( )( )
∫= max
Fn
max dnnD;FU
f
0
α ,  
with  
( )
( ) 0
1 >⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +⋅=+
α
c
DF
cDFd
D;FdU max
max
max   
and  
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( )
( ) 0
1
22
2
≥⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +⋅=+
−αα
c
DF
cDFd
D;FUd max
max
max .  
The curvature shown in figure 2.5 can be explained as follows. The larger the initial 
donation D  is, the less user-fee revenues are needed to reach a certain project volume 
DF +  and, hence, the fewer applicants are excluded. Consequently, more individuals can 
be served by a further increase of the user fee which extends the maximum project volume. 
The three boundaries define the spectrum of possible utility functions. As an example, 
consider the graph ( )D~;FU . At D~  the entrepreneur charges no user fee and the service of 
the poorest cD~  individuals provides her with utility of ( )D~;U 0 . The introduction of user 
fees initially enhances the entrepreneur’s utility due to a dominating revenue effect. As the 
project volume reaches D~F +∗  the crowding-out effect offsets the revenue effect, and an 
interior utility maximum results.  
 
2.2.3 VARIATION IN DONATIONS 
In figure 2.5, the social entrepreneur’s donations amount to D~  and the project volume 
D~F +∗  is chosen. In this section, we analyze how the optimal choice of user-fee revenues 
and, hence, the optimal project volume change when donations increase. We argue that 
various results are possible and that their occurrence strongly depends on the 
entrepreneurs’ level of poverty aversion and the status-quo level of donations. More 
specifically, given that the initial level of donations is sufficiently low, the project volume 
increases for relatively low levels of poverty aversion and it decreases for relatively high 
levels. Moreover, there is a specific value of α  for which the optimal project size remains 
unchanged. However, given that the status-quo level of donations is relatively high, all 
entrepreneurs increase the project volume.  
This section primarily focuses on the second entrepreneurial reaction, namely the 
reduction of the optimal project size, since this appears to be least intuitive. Figure 2.6 
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characterizes the change of the allocative outcome.41 The figure shows the direct effect of 
the exogenous increase of donations and then decomposes the entrepreneur’s reaction into 
two steps. Consider first panel (a). Given a constant user fee, an increase in donations 
additionally increases the user-fee revenues. This result is obtained by differentiating total 
entrepreneurial revenues with respect to donations, where user-fee revenues are given by 
equation (2.2), 
(2.12) ( )[ ] ∗∗∗∗ −=+−=+ fc cfc fdD DD;fFd 1 . 
As a consequence, the entrepreneur’s marginal utility of charging user fees decreases:  
(2.13) ( ) 0112 ≤⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −⋅⋅−=∂∂
∂ −
∗
= ∗ c
nn
fcDF
D;FU
F
FF
αα . 
Intuitively, consider the particular project volume ( ) ( )111 D;fnfn ∗∗ −  at which the 
crowding-out effect ( )( )0≤⋅− Fnnn αα  and the revenue effect ( )( )01 ≥⋅ cnα , as defined 
by equation (2.9), offset each other. Now, the increase in donations enables the 
entrepreneur to cover the difference between marginal costs and user fee for previously 
unconsidered applicants. Moreover, the fee paid by the new recipients additionally 
increases the entrepreneur’s revenues. As a result, the value of the “new” wealthiest 
recipient ( )21 D;fn ∗  is lower and the marginal utility of increasing the user fee becomes 
negative.  
As a consequence, the entrepreneur wishes to reduce the user-fee receipts to readjust 
the crowding-out and the revenue effect. Given that this reduction does not compensate for 
the previous increase in total revenues, the optimal project volume rises compared to the 
status quo. On the other hand, the optimal project size decreases if the user fee reduction 
overcompensates the previous increase in total revenues. In this case, the absolute change 
of the entrepreneur’s marginal utility (equation (2.9)) is larger for an increase of donations 
than for a decrease of user-fee revenues. 
 
                                                 
41 For notational clarity the terms ( )fn  in figure 2.6 and ( )fF  are expanded to ( )D;fn  and ( )D;fF  to 
emphasize the influence of donations. 
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( )0n
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(a)                                                       (b)                                                       (c) 
Figure 2.6: A decrease of the optimal project volume as the highly poverty-averse entrepreneurial reaction. 
 
The analysis of the entrepreneur’s reduction of user-fee receipts is decomposed into 
two steps illustrated by panels (b) and (c) in figure 2.6. In panel (b) we consider a first 
reduction such that the project volume reaches the status-quo level 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]( )111222 D;fnfnD;fnfn ∗∗ −=′−′ . This partial adjustment provides an important 
result: The equally large reduction of user-fee revenues increases the revenue effect of 
equation (2.9) to the same extent as the marginal utility decreases due to the additional 
donations (equation (2.13)).42 In other words, if we leave the crowding out of recipients 
unconsidered, any variation in revenues (i.e. donations or user fees) identically affects the 
entrepreneur’s marginal utility. As a consequence, it suffices to analyze the impact of the 
considered user-fee reduction on the non-positive crowding-out effect. Given that this 
effect decreases, the resulting total change of the revenue and crowding-out effect is, in 
absolute terms, larger for an increase of donations than for a decrease of user-fee revenues. 
We assume this scenario to be given in figure 2.6. Therefore, in panel (b), the 
entrepreneur’s marginal utility of charging additional user fees is negative at the status-quo 
project volume ( ) ( )222 D,fnfn ′−′  and the entrepreneur is induced to further reduce user-
fee revenues until the new optimal project volume ( ) ( )222 D,fnfn ∗∗ −  is reached. This 
outcome is characterized in panel (c).  
                                                 
42 This result is shown within the next proof. 
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A sufficiently high level of poverty aversion, which exceeds the specific lower limit 
α 43, causes a decreasing crowding-out effect for the following reason. In figure 2.6, panel 
(b), the values of the two marginal recipients ( )2fn ′  and ( )22 D;fn ′ , as components of this 
effect, are strictly higher than in panel (a) ( ) ( )( )111 and D;fn    fn ∗∗ . Since both values are 
weighted exponentially by the entrepreneur’s level of poverty aversion, the utility 
difference between the marginal recipients is larger in panel (b). In other words, the utility 
loss of substituting the wealthiest for the poorest marginal recipient is c. p. larger, the 
poorer both individuals are, and, consequently, the lower the non-positive crowding-out 
effect is.  
The effect of increasing donations on the social entrepreneur’s utility function is 
depicted in figure 2.7. According to figure 2.6, the figure likewise characterizes a reduction 
of the optimal project volume. In the status quo, the entrepreneur receives the donations 
1D  and chooses the optimal level of user-fee revenues 
∗
1F . Now, consider an increase in 
donations to 2D . Since the entrepreneur shows a relatively high level of poverty aversion, 
she reduces user-fee receipts to an even larger extent ( )1221 DDFF −>− ∗∗ , which 
decreases the optimal project volume.  
 
U
F,D1D
( )1D;0U ( )1D;FU
∗+ 11 FD
( )11 D;FU ∗
( )22 D;FU ∗
2D
( )2D;0U
∗+ 22 FD
( )2D;FU
 
Figure 2.7: The shift of the utility function due to an increase in donations. 
 
                                                 
43 The conditions specifying α  are presented within the next proof. For the current argumentation it suffices 
to set 1>α . 
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It is important to highlight again: The social entrepreneur’s choice of a positive level 
of user-fee revenues in the status quo is a necessary precondition to the characterized result 
in figures 2.6 and 2.7. According to proposition 2.3, this choice requires that the level of 
poverty aversion falls short of a specific value αˆ . However, the entrepreneur reduces the 
project volume in response to increased donations if her poverty aversion exceeds the 
lower limit α . Given that αˆ  falls short of α , all entrepreneurs with a poverty aversion 
level below αˆ  charge user fees but, given donations increase, all of them react with an 
enlargement of the project volume. In contrast, those entrepreneurs who, in principle, show 
the propensity to reduce the optimal project size ( )αα ≥  do not charge user fees in the 
status quo. Instead, their project volume increases by the amount of the additionally 
obtained donations. Consequently, only if αα ˆ< , the predicted behavior occurs. The next 
proposition shows that a sufficiently low level of status-quo donations ensures that αα ˆ< . 
Moreover, it will be proven that an increase in donations leads to a reduction of the optimal 
project volume if the entrepreneur’s poverty aversion falls between both parameter values. 
Proposition 2.5. There exists a level of donations ( ) cn'D ⋅< 0  and a level of poverty 
aversion α , such that for all [ )'D,D 0∈  and ( )ααα ˆ,∈ , an increase in donations leads to a 
reduction of the optimal project volume DF +∗ .  
Proof. See Appendix. 
Corollary. Given [ )'D,D 0∈  and let donations increase, then entrepreneurs with αα =  do 
not change and entrepreneurs with αα <  increase the optimal project volume DF +∗ .  
Proof. Consider again the proof of proposition 2.5. An increase in donations leads to a 
constant optimal project volume if ( )∗∗ −−= fccdDdF  or, equivalently, if the value of 
equation (A.2.1), namely Ω , is zero. The proof showed that this is uniquely fulfilled for 
αα = . On the other hand, an increase in the optimal project volume requires that 
( )∗∗ −−> fccdDdF  which gives a negative sign of Ω . The proof showed that this is 
fulfilled for all αα < . Q.e.d.  
Proposition 2.5 consists of two parts. First, it claims that social entrepreneurs reduce 
their project volume in response to increased donations if their level of poverty aversion 
exceeds the lower limit α . The intuition of the proposition follows the argumentation 
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given previously in this section. Accordingly, for those high levels of α  the non-positive 
crowding-out effect decreases if user-fee revenues are reduced. Moreover, as the corollary 
outlines, the crowding-out effect and, hence, the optimal project volume remain unchanged 
if αα =  and increase if αα < . 
Second, a precondition to the result of the proposition’s first part is the imposition of 
user fees in the status quo or, equivalently, a level of poverty aversion below αˆ . Only if α  
falls short of αˆ  there is room for the existence of entrepreneurs decreasing the project 
volume. This requirement is fulfilled if the status-quo level of donations is sufficiently low. 
The corresponding intuition proceeds as follows. As the extreme case, consider an 
entrepreneur with an infinitesimal amount of donations. With these funds at hand she is 
restricted to serve only an insignificant quantity of individuals. Hence, the exponentially 
weighted value difference between the marginally poorest and the marginally wealthiest 
recipient, i.e. the crowding-out effect, is negligible for finite levels of poverty aversion. 
However, there exists a significant revenue effect because an increase of one unit of user-
fee receipts enables the entrepreneur to considerably enlarge the group of recipients 
compared to the initial quantity. Therefore, the level of poverty aversion αˆ  at which the 
negative (and insignificant) crowding-out effect outweighs the positive (and significant) 
revenue effect is infinitely large. On the other hand, consider an entrepreneur with initial 
donations sufficing to serve almost all individuals. Here, since the absolute value of the 
crowding-out effect reaches its maximum whereas the revenue effect becomes 
infinitesimal ( 0→n ), the level of poverty aversion at which the crowding-out effect 
dominates the revenue effect approaches zero. As a result, possible values of αˆ  range from 
zero to infinity and are negatively correlated to the status-quo amount of donations. 
In contrast, the parameter value α  is finite. Consider again the discrete project volume 
depicted in figure 2.6, panel (b). As argued previously, an entrepreneur with the poverty 
aversion α  is indifferent between the status-quo volume ( ) ( )222 D,fnfn ′−′  and a smaller 
one resulting from a marginal reduction of user fees. Since any of those comparisons 
always presumes a positive level of user-fee revenues, both project sizes are significant. 
Consequently, an entrepreneur valuing the two project volumes equally must have a finite 
level of poverty aversion α . Comparing this result with the argued range of αˆ -values, it 
follows that α  falls below αˆ  if the status-quo amount of donations is relatively low. 
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The results of this section are summarized as follows. Given that the status-quo level 
of donations is sufficiently low, an increase in donations leads to mixed reactions of social 
entrepreneurs concerning their optimal choice of the project size (measured in total 
revenues DF +∗ ). Specifically, relatively low poverty-averse entrepreneurs increase the 
project volume while those with relatively high aversion decrease it. Moreover, 
entrepreneurs with a specific value α  do not change the volume at all. However, given 
that the status-quo level of donations is relatively high, all entrepreneurs increase the 
project volume. In the next section, we conclude with a discussion of these results. 
 
2.2.4 CONCLUSION 
Our objective in section 2.2 was to develop a positive model of the pricing decision of a 
social entrepreneur in the light of other exogenous and limited third-party funds. Beside the 
user fee, we assumed the entrepreneur to handle congestion by applying a non-price 
rationing instrument. It enables the entrepreneur to provide the good to her most valued 
applicants that are able to pay the user fee. Moreover, we assumed that the social 
entrepreneur is poverty averse, i.e. she prefers an individual more, the poorer the person is, 
and, thus, applied a simplified version of the general motive of inequity aversion. Subject 
to a nonprofit-condition, the entrepreneur maximizes the aggregated value of served 
individuals.  
Concerning the optimal user fee and, correlated with it, the optimal project volume, we 
found three qualitatively different outcomes. First, given that the entrepreneur shows no 
poverty aversion and values all individuals equally, she decides for the user fee which 
maximizes the project size. Rationing arises exclusively for the poorest applicants who 
lack the necessary payment ability. Second, if poorer individuals receive a larger value 
than wealthier applicants, allocations arise, in which a moderate user fee is chosen and 
applicants on both ends of the income scale are rationed. Finally, given a sufficiently high 
poverty aversion, the good is allocated for free and the poorest individuals receive the 
good. In this case, the entrepreneur exclusively rations the wealthiest applicants by use of 
the non-price allocation mechanism.  
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As we have shown with our analysis, the introduction of a poverty aversion parameter 
into the entrepreneur’s utility function enables us to explain observable practices of 
nonprofit organizations. Specifically, we are able to explain differences in the choice of 
user fees and non-price rationing instruments, as well as their application intensity, even 
though the organizations operate in the same branch and in the same region.44 There are 
social businesses being confronted with substantial congestion but, simultaneously, do not 
charge user fees at all, such as soup kitchens or homeless shelter.45 At the other extreme, 
there may be nonprofit businesses in similar situations charging sufficiently high prices to 
supply all applicants, such as university cafeterias or youth hostels. One can also observe 
organizations which set positive user fees and face excess demand. Consider micro-health-
insurance schemes in India. Recipients pay relatively low insurance premiums but only 
certain population groups gain access.46  
Our analysis additionally showed that an increase of donations might not necessarily 
lead to an increase of the project volume. Entrepreneurs with relatively high levels of 
poverty aversion will wish to reduce their user-fee revenues to an even larger extent, 
although this theoretical phenomenon has yet to be confirmed empirically. Nevertheless, 
the result should be of particular interest to lead donors, typically granting a significant and 
often the largest part of the initial financial need of social entrepreneurs.47 If donor and 
entrepreneur disagree on the optimal quantity and composition of recipients, their 
regulation in form of a variation of the donation volume may have unintended effects 
which should be taken into account. 
 
2.2.5 APPENDIX 
Proof of proposition 2.5. Let ( )[ )cn,D ⋅∈ 00  and αα ˆ<  with 
                                                 
44 Recall the example mentioned in section 2.1: In Germany, food pantries typically allocate their products 
through applying a mix of user fees and poverty criteria. Rohrmann (2009) reports that the fraction of 
pantries, which formulate eligibility requirements, varied between 76.2 percent (2002) and 96 percent (2007). 
User fees were charged by 65 percent (2002) and 89 percent (2007) of the organizations and differed between 
0.50 and 2 Euro per food ration. 
45 In 1998, all 971 New York food pantries analyzed by Food for Survival (2000) charged no user fees, 
although 34 percent of the pantries had to turn people away. 
46 See McCord et al. (2001). 
47 See Andreoni (1998, 2006). 
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Then, according to proposition 2.3, 0>∗F .48 Now, consider equation (2.12). With 
0>= ∗ff , an increase in donations enlarges the entrepreneur’s total income by 
( )∗− fcc . Consequently, an increase in donations leads to a decrease of the optimal 
project volume if ( )∗∗ −−< fccdDdF . Applying the implicit function theorem to the 
first-order condition yields 
( )
( ) ∗=
∗
−−<∂∂
∂∂∂−=
∗ fc
c
FD;FU
DFD;FU
dD
dF
FF
22
2
,  
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( ) 22 FD;FU ∂∂  is given by equation (2.10) and ( )( ) ∗=∂∂∂ FF DFD;FU2  by equation (2.13). 
Hence, the optimal project volume decreases if  
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The two terms of condition (A.2.1) characterize the change of the crowding-out effect due 
to an increase in user-fee revenues. The first term is positive by definition and the second 
term is nonnegative for all αα ′≥ , with  
( )
∗=
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⋅−+=′ FFF
nlnnln
cn
ln 111α .  
                                                 
48 Although αˆ  is not defined for 0=D , recall that, according to proposition 2.1, all entrepreneurs charge 
user fees. 
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Next, we show that a unique ( )αα ′∈ ,0  exists for which Ω  is zero. Hence, Ω  is 
positive for all αα >  and negative for all αα < . Rearranging equation (A.2.1) yields 
(A.2.2)  ( ) ( )n,zn,y~ ααΩ −=: , 
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With nn > , 0<Fn , and 0>FFn , ( )n,y α  is the product of a linear and a convex 
increasing function of α . Hence, ( )n,y α  is also increasing and convex in α . On the other 
hand, ( )n,z α  is linearly increasing in α . Consequently, the difference of both terms, Ω~ , 
has maximally two roots. Apparently, one is given for 0=α .49 There exists a second root 
for 0>=αα   if and only if ( )( ) ( )( ) 00 == < αα αααα dn,dzdn,dy , i.e. 
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This condition holds since 0→α  implies that maxFF →∗  and 0→n .50 Although the 
limits of αy  and αz  are infinity for 0→n , the application of l’Hôpital’s rule shows that 
αy  and αz  diverge and αα yz >  results: 
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49 This technical result does not imply that non-poverty-averse entrepreneurs do not change their project size 
if donations increase. Rather, in line with proposition 2.4, non-poverty-averse entrepreneurs behave project-
size maximizing. Consequently, their project volume increases with higher donations. The zero-value of 
equation (A.2.1) emanates from the fact, that a crowding-out effect does not exist for 0=α  and, hence, does 
not change if user-fee revenues are increased.  
50 Rearranging the first-order condition (setting equation (2.9) zero) yields ( )[ ] α111 −⋅−⋅= cnnn F  with 
( )[ ]
0
1 011lim
→
− =⋅−⋅α
αcnn     F . 
SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS 
 
43
Consequently, there exists a unique ( )αα ′∈ ,0  for which the value of Ω~ , or respectively 
Ω , is zero. 
Yet, we assumed that αα ˆ<  and derived the requirement, that αα > . Consequently, 
an increase in donations leads to a reduction of the optimal project volume if αα ˆ<  and 
( )ααα ˆ,∈ . However, αα ˆ<  requires a sufficiently low level of donations. For 
( ) cnD ⋅→ 0 , nlnnln − , which determines αˆ  and α′ , is infinitely large, such that 0→αˆ  
and 1→′α . Since αα ′< , it must hold that ( )10,∈α  and, consequently, αα ˆ> . In other 
words, given that the amount of donations is relatively high, all entrepreneurs react with an 
enlargement of the project volume on an increase in donations. In contrast, for 0→D , 
( ) 00 →− =Fnlnnln  and, hence, ∞→αˆ . According to proposition 2.3, all entrepreneurs 
with αα ˆ<  choose ∗F >0. Consequently, ( ) 0>− ∗=FFnlnnln  and ( )∞∈′ ,1α . Since 
αα ′< , it holds that αα ˆ< . As a result, there exists a specific level of donations 'D  such 
that αα ˆ= , if DD ′= , and αα ˆ< , if [ )'D,D 0∈ . Hence, for all [ )'D,D 0∈  an increase in 
donations leads to a reduction of the optimal project volume DF +∗ , if ( )ααα ˆ,∈ . Q.e.d. 
 
2.3 RATIONING BY USER-FEE DISCRIMINATION AND QUALITY DILUTION51 
In this section, we analyze how the entrepreneur’s decision behavior changes when she 
decides not only on the poverty composition and the quantity of recipients, but also on the 
quality of the social good. Additionally, we allow the entrepreneur to price discriminate 
individuals perfectly. As in the previous analysis, at first, we characterize allocation 
patterns in dependence on the entrepreneur’s inequity aversion. Afterwards, we analyze 
how a variation in donations and input costs impacts her rationing behavior.  
 
2.3.1 THE MODEL 
Again, consider a continuum of individuals [ ] ∗+⊆= Rn,n maxminN  seeking to satisfy a basic 
human need. Each individual N∈n  is willing to spend a budget ( )nb  on purchasing one 
                                                 
51 With little modification, this section is taken from Burchhardt and Starke (2010). 
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unit of a need-specific good. We assume that individuals are ordered according to their 
willingness to pay, such that ( ) 0<dnndb  and ( ) 0=maxnb . Different product qualities of 
the good are available on perfectly competitive markets where firms face zero profits, and 
the price of the good increases with its quality level. We distinguish individuals only by 
their budget and, therefore, assume that consumers’ preferences are identical. Moreover, 
their marginal utility of quality is strictly positive. The latter assumptions reflect the basic-
human-need character of the good. Intuitively, for this type of goods consumer preferences 
are similar and relatively intensive until a minimum quality level is reached. For example, 
the minimum level for food might be given by a balanced periodical nutrition. Together, as 
in section 2.2, our specifications of consumer preferences allow us to treat the terms 
willingness to pay and payment ability equally and, thus, to differentiate individuals by 
their income, i.e. poverty level. Accordingly, the individual maxn  is the poorest whereas 
minn  represents the wealthiest individual.  
Suppose a social entrepreneur is able to perfectly observe individual budgets. This 
assumption is supported by nonprofit practices, implying that it is quite common to 
differentiate the financial situation of needy people either through income verification 
sheets or through appropriate indicators.52 Moreover, Steinberg and Weisbrod (2005) argue 
that individuals may be willing to reveal their payment willingness to nonprofit but not to 
for-profit organizations. The social entrepreneur compares the individual budgets with a 
subjective social reference level srb , which might be equal to her own consumption budget 
or might be deduced from scientific or regulatory guidelines.53 This reference level 
determines the individuals the entrepreneur considers needy. For reasons of simplicity, we 
assume that all n  individuals own a budget endowment equal or below this level, i.e. 
( )minsr nbb = . Consequently, the social entrepreneur observes a budgetary inequity of 
( ) ( ) 0: ≥−= nbbnq srea  for the nth individual, which will be referred to in the following as 
ex-ante inequity.  
                                                 
52 Steinberg and Weisbrod (1998) provide a general discussion of these indicators. More specifically, FAO 
(2001) surveys and discusses the application of indicators of several nutrition programs in developing 
countries (e.g. socio-economic status, education level, age, household size, number of children etc.). As 
argued in footnote 34, although such practices are supposed to cause so-called targeting costs, again, we 
simplify by ignoring them. 
53 Exemplarily, the UK government (School Food Trust 2007) defined a minimum quality for school food by 
pinpointing items that have to be offered within a specific period. 
SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS 
 
45
In order to mitigate the ex-ante inequity the nonprofit entrepreneur offers one unit of a 
need-specific social good to any preselected individual. This selection is based on two 
related decisions: Which product quality should be offered and which needy subgroup 
should be targeted? We make three assumptions about the quality of the social good. First, 
the good is provided to all recipients at uniform quality, i.e. we do not consider quality 
discrimination. Second, the marginal costs of producing an additional unit of the social 
good ∗+∈ Rc  are independent of the supplied quantity but positively correlated to the 
product’s quality level.54 In the following, we do not distinguish between quality and 
marginal production costs and denote quality equivalently by c . Third, for reasons of 
simplicity, it is assumed that the quality of the social good is produced with the same 
technology as the market good.  
In order to illustrate the setting we have in mind, consider the following application to 
food-consumption. Here, the good is viewed as a bundle of staple foods of specific 
quantity and quality. Any change in the composition of the bundle that increases need 
satisfaction is modeled as an increase in the good’s quality. Hence, an increase in the 
number and scope of meals through additional food as well as an increase in the quality of 
a single item enhances the overall quality.  
The second decision of the social entrepreneur concerns the composition and size of 
the target group. As will be argued by the following assumptions, this decision solely 
requires the choice of the marginally poorest recipient N∈n . First, we define 
[ )n,nn min∈  as the marginally wealthiest recipient and we assume that the group of served 
individuals lies in the closed interval [ ]n,n , with the quantity of recipients given by nn − . 
Furthermore, we allow the entrepreneur to perfectly discriminate prices. The differentiation 
of user fees according to payment ability, which is often observed in practice, is a basic 
assumption in models of nonprofit firms.55 In this regard, Hansmann (1980) as well as 
Steinberg and Weisbrod (1998) provide numerous examples of nonprofit industries 
                                                 
54 A different approach is taken by Rose-Ackerman (1987), who argues that the marginal costs of quality for 
the provision of social goods are zero. Although sharing the opinion that there exist some factors improving 
quality without additional costs, e.g. changing school teaching from frontal to interactive mode, we account 
for the majority of dimensions where improvements in quality are costly. 
55 Theoretical aspects of price discrimination by nonprofits are studied in Le Grand (1975) and Steinberg and 
Weisbrod (2005). 
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frequently charging sliding-scale fees for different users. In our model, the social 
entrepreneur charges the nth individual a user fee that exactly corresponds to the budget 
endowment ( )nb . The individual purchases the social good, if its quality c  does not fall 
short of the user-fee level, i.e. ( )nbc ≥ , or, in other words, if its quality is at least as high 
as the affordable quality of the market good.56 Consequently, the entrepreneur’s total user-
fee revenues F  are given by 
(2.14) ( )∫=
n
n
dn nbF . 
In addition to these revenues, the entrepreneur receives an exogenously given level of 
donations ( )maxD,D 0∈ , with 
( )[ ] ( )∫−⋅−= max
min
n
n
srminmaxmax dn nbbnnD   
as the maximum level at which all individuals are served at social reference quality. In line 
with the organization’s nonprofit status user-fee revenues and donations have to be spent 
completely on financing the allocation of the social good to needy individuals, i.e.  
(2.15) ( )nncDF −⋅=+ . 
The nonprofit-condition (2.15) shows that for given levels of donations D  and individual 
budgets ( )nb , the entrepreneur’s choice of the good’s quality c  and the marginally poorest 
recipient n  determines the marginally wealthiest recipient ( )n,cnn =  and, likewise, the 
size of the target group ( )n,cnn − . These dependencies are depicted in figure 2.8.  
Given the individual endowments ( )nb , the social entrepreneur is confronted with the 
status-quo budgetary inequity ( ) ( )nbbnq srea −= . With donations D  at hand, she decides 
on the quality level c  of the social good and determines the specific target group by choice 
of the poorest recipient n . Due to the nonprofit-condition, she completely spends 
donations to cover the difference between marginal costs c  and individual contributions. 
                                                 
56 Recall that firms face zero profits in perfectly competitive markets and use the identical production 
technology as nonprofit organizations. Consequently, the quality an individual purchases from the market 
equals the budget which is spent. 
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c,b
srb
maxn
( )nb
c
n
D
( )n,cF
( )n,cn nminn  
Figure 2.8: Allocation effects of the choice of quality and target group. 
 
Starting with the poorest recipient the funds suffice to subsidize ( )n,cnn −  individuals. 
Since recipients have to pay a user fee equal to their payment abilities, total user-fee 
revenues amount to ( )n,cF . Subsequent to the allocation of the social good, there remains 
an inequity with served individuals amounting to ( ) cbcq srep −=: , which will be referred to 
as ex-post inequity in the following. With the choice of her allocation the entrepreneur 
simultaneously shows two types of rationing. First, by choosing the target group she 
completely rations all individuals ( )[ ]n,n,cnn∉ . Second, her determination of a quality 
level partially rations all recipients since they do not receive the social reference level.  
As motivated in this chapter’s introduction, we characterize the social entrepreneur as 
an inequity-averse decision maker. Specifically, she draws a negative utility from a 
deviation of an individual’s consumption possibilities ( )nb  from the social reference level. 
By providing needy individuals with the social good she reduces the inequity and, hence, 
her own disutility.  
The inequity-aversion motive is introduced into our model through the parameter 
+∈ Rα . It determines the social entrepreneur’s disutility from inequity by exponentially 
weighting ( )nqea  and ( )cqep , respectively. The functional form of her disutility can be 
written as  
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(2.16) ( ) αqqv = , with ( ) ( ){ }cq,nqq epea∈ . 
The parameter α  thereby determines the level of the constant elasticity of marginal 
disutility 1−=αε  and is likewise a measure for the curvature of value function (2.16).57 
Additionally, as with the class of Cobb-Douglas utility functions, α  characterizes the 
entrepreneur’s intensity of disutility. Marginal disutility is decreasing with ( )10  ,∈α , 
constant with 1=α , and increasing with ( )∞∈ ,1α .58 More specifically, an entrepreneur 
with 0=α  does not care about differences in budgetary inequity between individuals and 
values ( )nqea  and ( )cqep  identically. In contrast, for any positive α  the entrepreneur 
draws an increased disutility from individuals being subject to higher inequity. This 
increase in disutility is the larger the higher the value of α  is, and it becomes infinite with 
∞→α .59 As will be shown later, entrepreneurs with extreme inequity aversion care only 
for the poorest target group individuals.  
Based on the introduced disutility concept, we now characterize the social 
entrepreneur’s utility from allocating one unit of the social good to a target group 
individual by the following functional form:  
(2.17) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )αα cbnbbcqvnqvn,cu srsrepea −−−=−= . 
Her utility equals the difference between the weighted ex-ante and ex-post inequity, i.e. the 
reduction of disutility through provision of the social good. As intuitive result, a non-
inequity-averse entrepreneur ( )0=α  receives no utility from allocating the good 
independent of the type of recipient. Hence, she does not engage in the social-good 
provision.  
As previously argued, by simultaneously choosing the quality level c  of the social 
good and the poorest recipient n , the entrepreneur, due to nonprofit condition (2.15), 
indirectly determines the wealthiest recipient ( )n,cn  and, hence, also the quantity of 
                                                 
57 The elasticity of marginal disutility is defined as ( )[ ] ( )[ ]qvqdqqvd ′⋅′=ε . 
58 With these specifications of marginal disutility we broaden the scope of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), who 
integrate α  multiplicatively into the utility function and, hence, restrict their analysis to linear inequity 
aversion, i.e. constant marginal disutility. However, they also observe “a nonnegligible fraction of people 
who exhibit nonlinear inequality aversion” in dictator experiments (p. 823). 
59 Note that the case ∞=α  corresponds to maximin-preferences.  
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(2.19) 
served individuals, ( )n,cnn − . Aggregating the utility values of equation (2.17) for each 
recipient then yields the following total utility level: 
(2.18) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]
( )
dncbnbbn,cn,n,cU  
n
n,cn
srsr∫ −−−= αα . 
For reasons of tractability, the notation of utility function (2.18) includes the entrepreneur’s 
decision variables c  and n  as well as their influence on the value of the wealthiest 
recipient ( )n,cn . We thereby allow for a precise characterization of the entrepreneur’s 
scope of alternatives: Under consideration of nonprofit-condition (2.15), the entrepreneur 
can (directly or indirectly) vary two of the variables with the third kept constant. The 
maximization problem of the entrepreneur is given by  
                ( )( )n,cn,n,cU  max
n,c
    
            ( )[ ] 0   s.t. =−− ∫ dn nbcD
n
n
.60 
In the following, we prove the existence of corner and interior solutions to 
maximization problem (2.19).61  
Proposition 2.6. Weakly inequity-averse entrepreneurs ( )(0,1)∈α  choose the maximum 
quality ( )srbc =∗  and provide only the wealthiest individuals ( )minnn,cn =∗∗ )( . On the 
other hand, highly inequity-averse entrepreneurs ( ))1( ∞∈ ,α  serve only the poorest 
applicants ( )maxnn =∗  at the lowest feasible quality ( )))(( maxn,cnbc ∗∗ = . Finally, interior 
optima ( srbc ≤∗  and )maxnn ≤∗  only exist if 1=α . 
Proof. See Appendix. 
                                                 
60 Employing equation (2.14) into nonprofit-condition (2.15) and rearranging it with respect to D  yields 
( )[ ]∫ −= n
n
dnnbcD . 
61 Utility function (2.18) is similar to the normative poverty measure put forward by Foster et al. (1984). 
Applying this measure Bourguignon and Fields (1990) analyze optimal governmental subsidies to 
individuals. Their findings resemble the results of proposition 2.6. 
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If donations are insufficient to serve all needy individuals, the social entrepreneur 
chooses the mix of quality and recipients that maximizes her utility from reduced inequity 
under the fulfillment of nonprofit-condition (2.15). As proposition 2.6 shows, a first 
maximum is given for weakly inequity-averse entrepreneurs ( )(0,1)∈α . Their marginal 
utility of serving the next poorer recipient is always lower than both their marginal utility 
of an improvement in quality (given a constant wealthiest recipient) and their marginal 
utility of serving the next wealthier recipient (given a constant quality). Consequently, the 
entrepreneur maximizes the social-good quality ( )srbc =∗  and serves only the wealthiest 
recipients ( )minnn,cn =∗∗ )( . Intuitively, weakly inequity-averse entrepreneurs show the 
highest marginal disutility of inequity for marginal deviations of individual budgets from 
the social reference level. As immediate consequence, the first unit of donations (in form 
of the social good) is used to completely eliminate the inequity of the wealthiest needy 
individual ( )minnn →  which requires the entrepreneur to choose the maximum quality for 
the good. Until the entire donations are spent, individuals are successively supplied 
according to the next higher inequity. The characterized corner solution is depicted in 
figure 2.9, panel (a). 
 
c,b
srbc =∗
( )nb
∗n
D
( )∗∗ n,cF
( ) minnn,cn =∗∗ n
c,b
srb
( )nb
∗c
∗n
D
( )∗∗ n,cF
( )∗∗ n,cn n
c,b
srb
maxnn =∗
( )nb
∗c
D
( )∗∗ n,cF
( )∗∗ n,cn n  
(a)                                                 (b)                                                   (c) 
Figure 2.9: Corner allocations and an arbitrary interior solution. 
 
Second, interior optima ( srbc ≤∗  and )maxnn ≤∗  exist for moderately inequity-averse 
entrepreneurs ( )1=α . Their marginal utility of a change in each of the three variables is 
equally large, which allows for any values that satisfy nonprofit-condition (2.15). 
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Entrepreneurs in this category show a constant marginal disutility of inequity and, thus, do 
not care for which applicants and to what level inequity is reduced. An arbitrary interior 
solution is characterized in figure 2.9, panel (b). Throughout the rest of section 2.3 the case 
of 1=α  will no longer be analyzed. Independent of the subsequently considered parameter 
variations it can be shown that the marginal utilities of quality, the wealthiest and the 
poorest recipient remain equally large. Consequently, any allocation satisfying nonprofit-
condition (2.15) is optimal and, therefore, 1=α  has no further explanatory value. 
Third, the marginal utility of highly inequity-averse entrepreneurs ( ))1( ∞∈ ,α  is lower 
for an improvement in quality than for a provision of both the next poorer and the next 
wealthier recipient. The resulting allocation is depicted in figure 2.9, panel (c). Here, only 
the poorest recipients ( )maxnn =∗  are served at the minimum quality ( )))(( ∗∗∗ = n,cnbc .62 
The intuition runs contrary to that of panel (a). Since the marginal disutility from inequity 
is largest for the highest inequity level, utility is maximized, if donations are transferred to 
the poorest individuals ( ))( ∗∗− n,cnnmax , such that the ex-post inequity is equal across 
recipients but highest across all needy individuals. This procedure determines the low 
quality level of the social good.  
In addition to these findings, figure 2.9 (panel (c)) indicates that highly inequity-averse 
entrepreneurs choose to serve the largest quantity of needy individuals ( )( )∗∗∗ − n,cnn . 
However, this result only holds if the function of budget endowments ( )nb  is convex. 
More specifically, differences in the chosen target-group quantity depend on both the 
social entrepreneurs’ inequity aversion and the curvature of the ( )nb -function, as we show 
formally with the following proposition.  
Proposition 2.7. Highly inequity-averse entrepreneurs ( )( )∞∈ ,1α  serve the maximum 
quantity of individuals ( )∗∗∗ − n,cnn , if the ( )nb -curve is convex. In contrast, if ( )nb  is 
concave, then the quantity of recipients is largest for weakly inequity-averse entrepreneurs 
))10((  , ∈α . However, both types of entrepreneurs choose the same and likewise 
maximum quantity of recipients if ( )nb  is a linear function.  
                                                 
62 Interestingly, this is also the optimal allocation under maximin-preferences. 
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Proof. See Appendix. 
Intuitively, the maximum quantity of individuals is served if the required average 
subsidy margin, i.e. the average difference between constant marginal production costs c  
and the perfectly discriminated user fee ( )nb , is lowest. There are two requirements to a 
minimal average subsidy. First, since marginal production costs are assumed to be equal 
across individuals, and ( )nb  is a decreasing function in n , any target group is served with 
the lowest possible amount of donations, if the wealthiest recipient receives no subsidy. 
Otherwise, any positive subsidy to this individual would have to be likewise granted to 
each other recipient, implying increased spending of donations. Second, a minimum 
average subsidy margin arises among those recipients whose budgets are most uniformly 
distributed. For those individuals the gap between costs and user fee ( )nbc −  is smallest on 
average.  
Following proposition 2.6, the first requirement is met for all entrepreneurs with 
( )∞∈ ,0α \{ }1 . However, the fulfillment of the second requirement depends on the 
curvature of the function of budget endowments ( )nb . Given that ( )nb  is convex, 
individual budgets vary least among the poorest individuals, such that highly inequity-
averse entrepreneurs ( ))1( ∞∈ ,α  serve the maximum quantity of recipients. In contrast, 
given a concave ( )nb -function, budgets are most uniformly distributed among the 
wealthiest individuals which are supplied by weakly inequity-averse entrepreneurs 
( ))10( ,∈α . Consequently, they serve the maximum quantity of recipients. Finally, there 
exist no such differences in the distribution of individual budgets, if the ( )nb -curve is 
linear, which implies an equal and maximum target-group quantity for all entrepreneurs 
with ( )∞∈ ,0α \{ }1 . 
 
2.3.2 VARIATIONS IN DONATIONS AND INPUT COSTS 
As argued in section 2.3.1, the determinants of the social entrepreneur’s allocation decision 
include available third-party funds and production costs. These financial conditions are 
likely to change during the lifetime of a social business. A donor might withdraw or extend 
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announced funds or might simply terminate a long-term relationship. Input costs might 
vary due to periodic shortages or shocks on resource markets. In this section, we analyze 
the impact of those variations on the entrepreneur’s choice of target group and social-good 
quality.  
In principle, the social entrepreneur can alternatively use additional donations to serve 
more or different individuals, or to improve the quality of the social good. The next 
proposition shows that, on the one hand, entrepreneurs react differently on variations in 
donations but, on the other hand, the classification of corner and interior solutions by level 
of inequity aversion remains unaffected.63   
Proposition 2.8. Given an increase in donations, entrepreneurs with ( )∞∈ ,0α \{ }1  enlarge 
the quantity of served individuals ( ) ( )( )∗∗∗∗∗∗ −>− n,cnnn,cnn DDD . In particular, weakly 
inequity-averse entrepreneurs ( )( )10,∈α  keep serving the wealthiest individuals 
( ) ( )( )minDD nn,cnn,cn == ∗∗∗∗  at the social reference level ( )srD bcc == ∗∗  and expand 
their target group toward the next poorer individuals ( )∗∗ > nn D . In contrast, highly 
inequity-averse entrepreneurs ( ))1( ∞∈ ,α  still focus on the most needy individuals 
( )maxD nnn == ∗∗ , improve the social-good quality ( )∗∗ > ccD  and serve the next wealthier 
applicants ( ) ( )( )∗∗∗∗ < n,cnn,cn DD .  
Proof. See Appendix. 
Intuitively, an increase in donations does not affect the entrepreneur’s marginal 
disutility of ex-ante inequity as obtained from equation (2.16). Hence, there is no effect on 
her decision on how to reduce this inequity optimally, i.e. the order of her marginal utilities 
of quality c , marginally poorest recipient n , and marginally wealthiest beneficiary ( )n,cn  
remains unchanged. Consequently, entrepreneurs with ( )10,∈α  still have the highest 
marginal disutility for the lowest levels of inequity which incites them to serve the 
wealthiest individuals ( ) ( )( )minDD nn,cnn,cn == ∗∗∗∗  at social reference quality 
                                                 
63 In the following the entrepreneur’s decision variables are superscripted by D  to account for the state of 
increased donations.  
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( )srD bcc == ∗∗ . These recipients now comprise the ex-ante target group and, additionally, 
the next poorer applicants ( )∗∗ > nn D . Entrepreneurs with ( )∞∈ ,1α , on the other hand, 
eliminate the maximum disutility of inequity, if they keep on serving the poorest 
individuals ( )maxD nnn == ∗∗  at minimum quality. Additional donations are spent on 
serving the next wealthier applicants. However, these individuals are only willing to 
purchase the social good, if its quality is at least equal to their budget endowment. Hence, 
the entrepreneur, likewise, improves quality unless the wealthiest recipient is indifferent 
between the market and the social good ( )( )( )∗∗∗ = DDD n,cnbc . Consequently, the model 
predicts an increase in both the quantity of recipients and the social-good quality as 
reaction to an increase in third-party funds. 
As a second variation, consider a general increase in input costs (in the following 
indexed by superscript I ). Note that in section 2.3.1 we assumed perfectly competitive 
for-profit markets and identical quality-production technologies of for- and nonprofit firms. 
These assumptions imply that, for a constant quality, the increase in input costs equally 
increases the price of the market good. Additionally, it still holds that any individual 
owning a budget equal or below the quality level Ic  applies for the social good and 
individuals with ( ) Icnb >  demand the market good. The increase in input costs is reflected 
by a change of two parameters. First, the social reference budget increases ( )srIsr bb >  
because higher expenditures are required to purchase the corresponding consumption 
quality. Second, we assume that the total quantity of needy individuals enlarges by those 
people who are no longer able to afford the social reference consumption. As a result, the 
set of needy individuals is now characterized by [ ] ∗+⊆= Rn,n maxIminIN  with minImin nn <  
and ( )IminIsr nbb = .  
Given that the social entrepreneur does not change marginal production costs ( )ccI = , 
she is restricted to use qualitatively lower or less inputs per unit of the social good, which 
deteriorates its quality.  Alternatively, she could increase Ic  to keep the quality constant, 
but this, according to nonprofit-condition (2.15), would imply a decrease in the quantity of 
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served individuals. As proposition 2.9 shows, an increase in input costs leads to contrary 
reactions of social entrepreneurs depending on their level of inequity aversion.  
Proposition 2.9. For weakly inequity-averse entrepreneurs ( )( )10,∈α  an increase in input 
costs leads to a provision of wealthier individuals ( )( )IminII nn,cn =∗∗  at (unchanged) social 
reference quality ( )IsrI bc =∗ . In contrast, highly inequity-averse entrepreneurs ( )( )∞∈ ,1α  
keep serving the status-quo target group ( ) ( )( )∗∗∗∗∗∗ === n,cnn,cn    nnn IImaxI and  at 
constant marginal costs ( )( )( )maxI n,cnbcc ∗∗∗ == , i.e. lower quality.  
Proof. See Appendix. 
Weakly inequity-averse entrepreneurs ( )( )10,∈α  show the highest marginal disutility 
of ex-ante inequity for marginal deviations of individual budgets ( )nb  from the social 
reference level. An increased budget Isrb  required to consume the social-reference quality 
and a simultaneously enlarged quantity of needy individuals ( )minmaxIminmax nnnn −>− , 
thus, renders the initial choices of marginal costs ( )srbc =∗  and target group 
( )( )minsr nn,bn =∗  suboptimal. The entrepreneur reacts by increasing marginal costs to Isrb  
and shifting the target group toward the ‘new’ wealthiest applicants ( )( )IminIIsr nn,bn =∗ . 
This way, she eliminates the fraction of inequity with the highest disutility. As figure 2.10 
indicates, a complete shift in the target group occurs, if Isrb  is such that donations are 
insufficient to allocate the good to more than the “new” applicants at social reference 
quality, i.e.  
( )[ ]∫ −≤ min
I
min
n
n
I
sr dnnbbD . 
No initially served individual is further considered by the entrepreneur.  
In contrast, the marginal disutility of highly inequity-averse entrepreneurs ( )( )∞∈ ,1α  
increases with the inequity level. As shown in section 2.3.1, they choose to serve the 
poorest individuals ( )maxnn =∗  at minimum quality ( )( )( )maxn,cnbc ∗∗ = . Since an increase 
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c,b
( )nb
D
∗n n∗In minnIminn
I
sr
I bc =∗
srbc =∗ D
 
Figure 2.10: A complete shift of the target group as a weakly inequity-averse reaction on an increase in input 
costs 
 
in input costs exerts no effect on the relative poverty of individuals, i.e. the individuals 
within the set ( )[ ]maxmax n,n,cn ∗  are still poorest, the entrepreneur neither changes the target 
group ( ) ( )( )∗∗∗∗∗∗ === n,cnn,cn    nnn IImaxI and  nor the marginal production costs 
( )( )( )maxI n,cnbcc ∗∗∗ == . However, quality necessarily drops due to increased input costs.. 
Additionally, figure 2.10 indicates that a weakly inequity-averse social entrepreneur 
not only changes the composition of recipients but also their quantity. The next proposition 
shows that this change unambiguously depends on the curvature of the budget function 
( )nb .  
Proposition 2.10. Given a concave (convex) function of budget endowments ( )nb , weakly 
inequity-averse entrepreneurs ( ))10( ,∈α  increase (decrease) the quantity of served 
individuals, i.e. ( ) ( )∗∗∗∗∗∗ −>− n,cnnn,cnn III  ( ) ( )( ) n,cnnn,cnn III ∗∗∗∗∗∗ −<− , as a 
reaction to an increase in input costs. Given a linear budget function, they do not change 
the quantity of recipients.  
Proof. See Appendix. 
From proposition 2.7, we know that the quantity of recipients is negatively correlated 
with the average subsidy margin required to serve the targeted individuals. Since the 
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wealthiest recipient receives no subsidy independent of the input costs, this margin is only 
conditional on the distribution of individual budget endowments, i.e. the curvature of the 
( )nb -function. The average subsidy is thereby the smaller the more uniformly budgets are 
distributed. Given that ( )nb  is concave, the dispersion is lowest among the highest 
budgets. Consequently, the target group is larger after input costs increased, because 
recipients are wealthier on average. However, the ex-post quantity is smaller if ( )nb  is 
convex, which is exemplarily depicted in figure 2.10. Here, individual budgets are least 
uniformly distributed among the wealthiest applicants. Finally, due to the same reasoning, 
no differences occur if ( )nb  is linear. 
 
2.3.3 CONCLUSION 
Our objective in section 2.3 was to develop a positive model of a nonprofit entrepreneur’s 
allocation decision, which includes the selection of the target group and the quality of the 
social good, in the light of limited third-party funds. By assuming that a social 
entrepreneur`s decision is characterized by inequity aversion, we follow recent results of 
experimental economic research on social preferences. We demonstrate how this 
preference assumption conveys a better understanding of how the good’s quality, the 
quantity of recipients as well as their income distribution interact within the objective 
function of private nonprofit decision makers. Specifically, an improvement of service 
quality increases the consumption level of beneficiaries and, hence, reduces inequity. In 
contrast, an enlargement of the target group reduces the inequity for additional recipients. 
In both cases the entrepreneur benefits through a reduction of her disutility from inequity. 
Finally, the composition of recipients enters the decision calculus through the marginal 
disutility of inequity. With increasing (decreasing) marginal disutility the entrepreneur 
prefers to reduce a given amount of inequity of a poorer (wealthier) individual.     
We find that weakly inequity-averse entrepreneurs choose to provide wealthier 
individuals at high social reference quality. In contrast, highly inequity-averse 
entrepreneurs care for the poorest individuals but offer minimum quality. These results 
allow for two explanations of the low quality of services to the very poor. First, the goods 
or services considered in these studies were provided by highly inequity-averse 
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entrepreneurs and/or, second, they were supplied by weakly inequity-averse entrepreneurs 
applying a low subjective reference quality. Whether social entrepreneurs apply subjective 
reference levels or rather a societally standardized norm remains an empirical question.  
As a further result, we show that the quantity of supplied individuals depends on the 
curvature of the budget function. Given convexity (concavity), highly (weakly) inequity-
averse entrepreneurs serve the maximum number of needy people. Moreover, we find that 
entrepreneurs react differently with regard to variations in donations and input costs. 
Irrespective of the considered variation, entrepreneurs with low aversion never change the 
quality of the social good. In contrast, entrepreneurs with high aversion improve quality if 
additional funds are available, and they lower quality when inputs used for production 
become more expensive. Common to both types of decision makers is the provision of 
more individuals if donations increase. However, given a sufficiently high increase in input 
costs, highly inequity-averse entrepreneurs do not change the target group while weakly 
inequity-averse entrepreneurs serve a completely different (viz. wealthier) group.  
Our results yield implications for stakeholders of nonprofit organizations whose 
objectives are related to quality, quantity and the composition of recipients. More 
specifically, donors or governments aiming at maximizing the number of served 
individuals with given funds should fund entrepreneurs who focus on the poorest people, if 
the majority of needy individuals is relatively poor (suggesting a convex budget-function 
in the model). In contrast, stakeholders generally interested in minimizing the number of 
needy individuals, through a provision of maximum service quality, should support 
entrepreneurs serving less poor individuals. Those stakeholders do not even need to change 
their contribution if input costs increase. 
 
2.3.4 APPENDIX: PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS 2.6-2.10 
Proof of Proposition 2.6. For notational clarity, we temporarily expand the term 
( )( )n,cn,n,cU  to ( )( )α;n,cn,n,cU  to emphasize the influence of the entrepreneur’s 
inequity aversion. However, we simplify the explicit notation by use of U .  
SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS 
 
59
By inserting user-fee revenues (2.14) into nonprofit-condition (2.15) and applying the 
implicit function theorem, one obtains the partial dependencies 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] 0<−−−= nbcn,cnndcnd , ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )[ ] 0>−−= n,cnbcn,cnndcn,cnd  and 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )[ ] 1>−−= n,cnbcnbcndn,cnd . Given that ( )n,cn  is constant, the social 
entrepreneur increases c  at the cost of n , or vice versa, if her total utility level is 
increased. She leaves both decision variables unchanged if the utility maximum is reached. 
Equivalent considerations apply for the pairwise variations of c  and ( )n,cn , while keeping 
n  constant, as well as n  and ( )n,cn , with c  constant.  
Consider the variation of c  and n  for a constant ( )n,cn . The corresponding condition 
for marginal utilities can be written as  
(A.2.3)   
dc
nd
n
U
c
U ⋅∂
∂
<=
>
∂
∂ . 
Specifically, the entrepreneur increases (decreases) c  and likewise decreases (increases) n  
if (A.2.3) holds with > (<). Both variables are left unchanged if (A.2.3) holds with equality. 
Inserting the partial derivatives into condition (A.2.3) and rearranging it yields 
(A.2.4)   ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )[ ] ( )cbnbb
cbcbnbbnbb
srsr
srsrsrsr
−−−
−−−−⋅−
<=
> −1αα . 
As a first result, condition (A.2.4) holds with equality for 0=α  and 1=α . Since any 
entrepreneur with 0=α  draws no utility from and, hence, does not engage in the 
allocation of the social good, an interior utility maximum is solely given for 1=α . 
Furthermore, the right term of condition (A.2.4) is convexly increasing in α . Combining 
the two results gives ( ) ( )dcndnUcU ⋅∂∂>∂∂ , if ( )10,∈α , ( ) ( )dcndnUcU ⋅∂∂=∂∂ , 
if 1=α , and [ ] ( )dcndnUcU ⋅∂∂<∂∂ , if ( )∞∈ ,1α . 
The same reasoning applies to the pairwise variation of c  and ( )n,cn  for a constant 
n . Formulating the condition on marginal utilities yields 
(A.2.5)   ( )
( )
dc
n,cnd
n,cn
U
c
U ⋅∂
∂
<=
>
∂
∂ . 
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Its rearrangement gives a similar expression as shown in condition (A.2.4): 
(A.2.6)   ( )( )[ ] ( )( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )( )[ ] ( )cbn,cnbb
cbcbn,cnbbn,cnbb
srsr
srsrsrsr
−−−
−−−−⋅−
<=
> −1αα . 
Again, condition (A.2.6) holds with equality for 0=α  and 1=α  and its right term is 
convexly increasing in α . Hence, ( )[ ] ( )[ ]dcn,cndn,cnUcU ⋅∂∂>∂∂  if ( )10,∈α , 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]dcn,cndn,cnUcU ⋅∂∂=∂∂  if 1=α , and ( )[ ] ( )[ ]dcn,cndn,cnUcU ⋅∂∂<∂∂  if 
( )∞∈ ,1α . 
Finally, consider the pairwise variation of n  and ( )n,cn  for a constant c . Here, the 
condition on marginal utilities is written as 
(A.2.7)   ( )
( )
nd
n,cnd
n,cn
U
n
U ⋅∂
∂
<=
>
∂
∂ , 
or, equivalently,  
(A.2.8)   ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )[ ]
( )( )n,cnbc
cbn,cnbb
n,cnbc
cbn,cnbb,x srsrsrsr −
−−−
<=
>
+−
−−+−=
αααα
ϕ
ϕαϕ : , 
with ( )( ) ( ) 0: >−= nbn,cnbϕ  and 
( ) ( )( )[ ]
( )( )( ) ( ) 02
1
<=
>⋅+−
+−=∂
∂ − αϕ
ϕ
ϕ
αϕ α xˆ
n,cnbc
n,cnbb,x sr , 
with ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( )( )
1
:
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+−
−⋅−++−−+−⋅=
α
ϕϕϕαα n,cnbb
cbcbn,cnbbn,cnbcxˆ
sr
sr
srsr . 
For 0=α  and 1=α , condition (A.2.8) holds with equality and ( ) 0=αxˆ  and, hence, 
( ) 0=∂∂ ϕαϕ ,x . For { }10,≠α , ( ) ϕαϕ ∂∂ ,x  and ( ) αα dxˆd  are indeterminate. However, 
since ( ) 022 >αα dxˆd , it follows that ( ) 0<∂∂ ϕαϕ ,x  and, hence, 
( )[ ] ( )( )ndn,cndn,cnUnU ⋅∂∂<∂∂  if ( )10,∈α . ( )[ ] ( )( )ndn,cndn,cnUnU ⋅∂∂=∂∂  
if 1=α . Finally, ( ) 0>∂∂ ϕαϕ ,x  and ( )[ ] ( )( )ndn,cndn,cnUnU ⋅∂∂>∂∂  if ( )∞∈ ,1α . 
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The results of the pairwise comparisons show that, for any given α , the ordering of 
marginal utilities is independent of the levels of c , n , and ( )n,cn . Hence, with exception 
of the special case 1=α , the social entrepreneur directly or indirectly chooses the 
maximum levels of those two variables that show the highest marginal utility. Thus, 
combining the previous results, one obtains 
dc
nd
n
U
c
U ⋅∂
∂>∂
∂  and ( )
( )
nd
n,cnd
n,cn
U
n
U ⋅∂
∂<∂
∂  if ( )10,∈α , 
( )
( )
dc
n,cnd
n,cn
U
dc
nd
n
U
c
U ⋅∂
∂=⋅∂
∂=∂
∂  if 1=α , and 
( )
( )
nd
n,cnd
n,cn
U
n
U ⋅∂
∂>∂
∂  and ( )
( )
dc
n,cnd
n,cn
U
c
U ⋅∂
∂<∂
∂  if ( )∞∈ ,1α . 
Consequently, srbc =∗  and ( ) minnn,cn =∗∗  if ( )10,∈α , ∗c  and ∗n  can adopt any values 
that satisfy nonprofit-condition (2.15) if 1=α , and ( )( )∗∗∗ = n,cnbc  and maxnn =∗  if 
( )∞∈ ,1α . Q.e.d. 
Proof of Proposition 2.7. Let l  index the optimal choices for ( )10,∈α  and h  for 
( )∞∈ ,1α . The maximum quantity of recipients is given if the average subsidy margin to 
served individuals, ( )
( )
( )[ ]n,cnndnnbc
n
n,cn
−− ∫ , is minimal. Since ( ) 0<dnndb  and ∗c  is 
constant for all ( )[ ]∗∗∗∈ n,n,cnn , a minimum average margin implies non-subsidization of 
the marginally wealthiest recipient, i.e.  
(A.2.9)   ( )( ) 0=− ∗∗∗ n,cnbc ,  
which is, following the proof of proposition 2.6, fulfilled for 1≠α . Furthermore, for any 
two pairs ∗ic , 
∗
in  and 
∗
jc , 
∗
jn  fulfilling (A.2.9) and with 
∗∗ > ji cc  and for all 
( )( ]∗∗−∈ jjmax n,cnn,0μ , it holds that  
(A.2.10)   ( )( ) ( )( )μμ +−<=
>+− ∗∗∗∗∗∗ jjjiii n,cnbc  n,cnbc    if   ( ) 022 <=
>
dnnbd . 
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Consequently, if ( ) 022 >dnnbd , then the average individual subsidy margin is minimal 
for the choices ∗hc  and ( )maxh nn =∗  which implies the maximum quantity of served 
individuals ( )maxhmax n,cnn ∗− . In contrast, if ( ) 022 <dnnbd  then the choices ( )srl bc =∗  
and ∗ln  imply the maximum quantity of recipients ( )∗∗ − lsrl n,bnn . Finally, if 
( ) 022 =dnnbd , then we have ( ) ( )∗∗∗ −=− lsrlmaxhmax n,bnnn,cnn . Q.e.d. 
Proof of Proposition 2.8. From the proof of proposition 2.6, the order of the marginal 
utilities of c , n , and ( )n,cn , as given in (A.2.4), (A.2.6), and (A.2.8), is uniquely 
determined by α , and consequently independent of D . Thus, for ( )10,∈α  an increase in 
D  leads to sr
D bcc == ∗∗  and ( ) ( ) minDD nn,cnn,cn == ∗∗∗∗ . Given these values, nonprofit-
condition (2.15) is fulfilled if ∗∗ > nn D  which implies ( ) ( )∗∗∗∗∗∗ −>− n,cnnn,cnn DDD . 
In contrast, for ( )∞∈ ,1α  the entrepreneur chooses maxD nnn == ∗∗  and 
( )( )∗∗∗ = DDD n,cnbc  which implies ∗∗ > ccD  and ( ) ( )∗∗∗∗ < n,cnn,cn DD  and, hence, 
( ) ( )∗∗∗∗∗∗ −>− n,cnnn,cnn DDD . Q.e.d. 
Proof of Proposition 2.9. In the proof of proposition 2.6 we showed that the order of the 
marginal utilities of c , n , and ( )n,cn , as given in equations (A.2.4), (A.2.6), and (A.2.8), 
is uniquely determined by α , and hence independent of srb . Thus, for ( )10,∈α  an 
increase in input costs, i.e. an increase in srb , leads to 
I
sr
I bc =∗  and ( ) IminII nn,cn =∗∗ . In 
contrast, for ( )∞∈ ,1α  we obtain maxI nn =∗  and ∗∗ = ccI , which implies a decrease in 
social-good quality. Q.e.d. 
Proof of Proposition 2.10. The proof of proposition 2.7 shows that the quantity of 
recipients is negatively correlated to the average subsidy margin 
( )
( )
( )[ ]n,cnndnnbc
n
n,cn
−− ∫  to served individuals. Since, according to proposition 2.9, 
condition (A.2.9) is still fulfilled after input costs rise, i.e. ( )( ) 0=− ∗∗∗ III n,cnbc , 
differences in the average subsidy margin between the two states are uniquely determined 
by the sign of ( ) 22 dnnbd . With ∗∗ = Ii cc , ∗∗ = Ii nn , ∗∗ = cc j , and ∗∗ = nn j  and, hence, 
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( )( ]∗∗−∈ n,cnn, max0μ , it follows by condition (A.2.10) that if ( ) 022 <dnnbd  then the 
average individual subsidy margin is smaller for the choices ∗Ic  and ∗In  which implies 
( ) ( )∗∗∗∗∗∗ −>− n,cnnn,cnn III . In contrast, if ( ) 022 >dnnbd  then 
( ) ( )∗∗∗∗∗∗ −<− n,cnnn,cnn III . Finally, if ( ) 022 =dnnbd  then we have 
( ) ( )∗∗∗∗∗∗ −=− n,cnnn,cnn III . Q.e.d. 
 
2.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As argued in the previous sections, by incorporating the motive of inequity aversion into 
the objective function, we obtain an intuitive explanation of how social entrepreneurs trade 
off the level of neediness, the quantity of recipients, and the quality of the social good. We 
therefore close a gap in the literature on the rationing behaviour of nonprofit organizations, 
which does not provide an adequate motivation applicable to the field of poverty 
alleviation. Additionally, we contribute to two important issues posed in the 
entrepreneurship literature. First, we foster an understanding of motivational differences 
between social and commercial entrepreneurs. While the latter type of founder is generally 
considered as profit maximizing, a characterization of social entrepreneurs has mainly 
concentrated on necessary capabilities and activities. Second, future research on the design 
of nonprofits should be oriented toward optimal inequity reduction. Hence, the work 
should focus on an improvement of methods for detection and quantification of existing 
inequality, i.e. opportunity identification, and on the design of business models for its 
effective elimination.  
As a first indication that social entrepreneurs indeed act inequity averse, we are able to 
explain allocations that correspond to the evidence pinpointed in the introduction. 
However, since this evidence has only anecdotal character, there is need for more rigorous 
empirical confirmation of the models’ assumptions and predictions. In this respect, 
experiments might prove adequate since the entrepreneurial allocation of external funds via 
social goods is similar to the distribution decisions typically analyzed in the corresponding 
literature.  
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The analytical framework developed in this chapter constitutes a basis for analyzing 
additional issues of social entrepreneurial behavior. Specifically, it merits investigation of 
how the different allocation patterns change if stakeholders exert an influence on the social 
entrepreneur’s decision, which has been neglected so far. Especially, so-called lead donors, 
typically granting a significant and often the largest part of the initial financial need of 
nonprofit organizations, might wish to regulate if the entrepreneurial behaviour 
inadequately reflects their own objectives. However, the possibilities to regulate are 
limited since the social entrepreneur is generally better informed about the allocation (e.g. 
production costs or income of the target group) than the lead donor. This informational 
advantage might be due to geographic distances or a limited experience of the donor to 
assess social work. 
A second group of stakeholders that might exert influence on the entrepreneur’s 
allocation are volunteers. It can be expected that they participate in the organization, if 
their personal goals match the entrepreneurial mission.64 The more the objectives of both 
individuals deviate, the less effective working time is likely to be devoted by the volunteer. 
In the extreme case, the volunteer refrains from any cooperation. Given that the availability 
of the total voluntary work differs across combinations of target group and social-good 
quality, the entrepreneur faces the trade-off between departing from her own preferred 
allocation and forgoing voluntary work. In this respect, the influence of volunteers could 
cause deviations from the characterized allocations. 
Furthermore, our proposed models represent starting points for investigating a legal 
framework that optimally supports social entrepreneurship. In particular, extensions of the 
models would allow one to analyze the social entrepreneur’s reactions to public policies 
relevant to her set of alternatives. On the one hand, social entrepreneurs are directly 
impacted by governmental grants, taxation, or other nonfinancial regulations. Public 
policies also affect the nonprofit organization indirectly if they are aimed at for-profit 
businesses of the same industry. As we have argued in section 2.3, social entrepreneurs are 
restricted in setting prices since needy individuals can purchase a good of identical quality 
from for-profit businesses. Hence, any public policy that affects the competitive behaviour 
                                                 
64 Besley and Ghatak (2005) argue that a matching of the nonprofit’s mission with the preferences of workers 
increases their efforts and, hence, the organizational efficiency. 
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of commercial firms also exerts an indirect effect on the nonprofit’s set of alternatives. On 
the other hand, this set is even affected by policies that change the income structure of 
needy individuals, e.g. transfers, income taxation, or labour market regulations. Moreover, 
the studies of governmental policies might also contribute to the discussion related to 
figure 2.2 in the introductory section. Since regulations differ between countries, the 
analysis could explain observable differences in the composition of nonprofit income 
sources.  
Finally, it should be noted that the presented analysis is only restricted to the field of 
poverty alleviation. It remains to be investigated to what extent the motive of inequity 
aversion explains social entrepreneurial behavior in other activities. Although insufficient 
income of people might not be the main determinant of opportunities in those fields, other 
forms of inequality could be relevant, such as inequitable allocations of political or human 
rights, mental or physical capabilities, or cultural goods. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION65 
Entrepreneurs are frequently restricted by external financiers in exploiting their innovative 
ideas, which critics typically attribute to unfavorable financing conditions or access 
barriers to outside capital.66 Governments oppose these identified malfunctions by 
intervening in credit markets. In most cases the presumption of asymmetric information 
between borrower and debtor serves as the basis for evaluating the impact of federal 
initiatives on the allocation of credit.67 In contrast, some authors have analyzed 
governmental policies by assuming symmetric information in the credit market. They 
justify governmental initiatives with positive externalities, incompletely competitive 
markets, and regulative intentions.68 
In this chapter we take the view of symmetrically distributed information between 
lender and borrower. We find this assumption plausible for two reasons. On the one hand, 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that asymmetric information results in equilibrium credit 
rationing. However, several authors found this phenomenon not to be empirically 
significant which questions the presence of asymmetric information.69 On the other hand, 
increased banking competition and the second Basel-Accord set an incentive for banks to 
improve their credit rating systems enabling them to identify debtors’ probability of default 
more clearly.70 Treacy and Carey (2000) analyze the internal rating systems at the 50 
largest US banking organizations and find that a development along this line has been 
taken place since 1990 and “promises to continue to grow”. In the course of this 
                                                 
65 With little modification, this chapter is taken from Raith et al. (2006). 
66 Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994), Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), and quite recently Buera (2009) empirically 
confirm the existence of capital constraints.  
67 Examples are Smith (1983), Mankiw (1986), Smith and Stutzer (1989), Gale (1990), Innes (1991), Lacker 
(1994), Williamson (1994), and Parker (2002), who provide theoretical frameworks to evaluate the 
effectiveness of federal credit programs in coping with market imperfections. By additionally drawing on 
empirical data, Gale (1991) shows serious inefficiencies of those governmental interventions.  
68 See, for example, Penner and Silber (1973) or Lombra and Wasylenko (1984). Mayshar (1977) explains 
the subsidization of risky private projects with the incompleteness of the capital market and the existence of 
an income taxation system. 
69 Compare Berger and Udell (1992), Levenson and Willard (2000), and Cressy and Toivanen (2001). 
70 Jankowitsch et al. (2007) provide evidence for the magnitude of this incentive. Their results indicate that 
the improvement of a rating system from low to medium accuracy can increase the annual rate of return on a 
portfolio by 30-40 bp. 
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development credit scoring techniques and private information exchanges have become 
increasingly important.71  
Whereas credit rationing may call for federal credit programs in markets with 
asymmetric information, we justify governmental intervention here with the occurrence of 
positive externalities. Projects fail to be executed, because the private rate of return falls 
short of financing costs, even though the project is socially desirable. Especially innovative 
investment projects may feature social benefits that exceed their corresponding private 
rents. The reluctance of external sources to finance these ventures then leads to market 
failure. The credit market fails because the social benefit, as a result of project realization, 
is not included in the decision calculus of market participants.72 In their empirical 
assessment of industrial innovations Mansfield et al. (1977) find that “in about 30 percent 
of the cases, the private return was so low that no firm, with the advantage of hindsight, 
would have invested in the innovation, but the social rate of return from the innovation was 
so high that, from society’s point of view, the investment was well worthwhile.”73 In these 
cases governmental intervention would not only be desirable for entrepreneurs, but also 
socially legitimate.  
Our objective with the current analysis is to examine the conditions for optimal 
lending structures. The deduction of properties for the optimal design of federal credit 
programs requires, in a first step, the determination of federal lending objectives. We, 
therefore, compare the objectives of a sample of governmental institutions and programs. 
From this comparison three fundamental goals can be determined: (1) Correction of market 
failure, (2) compliance with the subsidiarity principle, and (3) efficient employment of 
means.  
We evaluate the achievement of the three identified objectives by means of a general 
credit-market model embedded in an interest-rate-risk-space. We choose this framework 
                                                 
71 Frame et al. (2001) show empirically that credit scoring, as an automated underwriting technique, reduces 
information asymmetry between borrowing small businesses and their lenders. Kallberg and Udell (2003) 
find similar results for private information exchanges by using data from Dun & Bradstreet. 
72 Our argumentation of market failure follows the definition given in Arrow (1962), who argues that the 
deviation of the investors’ return from the social benefit induces them to underinvest in R&D activities. As a 
modification, we assume that entrepreneurs refrain from launching innovative projects. 
73 Mansfield et al. (1977) find a median social return rate of 56 percent compared to a median private rate of 
25 percent within their 17 case studies. Further results can be found in Griliches (1992), who gives an 
overview of alternative R&D-models and emphasizes that, for all of these models, social rates of return lie 
significantly above the corresponding private rates.  
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for policy evaluation because we believe that most federal lending activities can be 
reduced to the use of either risk-reduction or interest-rate-subsidization instruments. In 
particular, loan guarantees, as a risk-reduction tool, are probably the most frequently used 
instrument worldwide74 with an improving effect on welfare figures. Riding and Haines 
(2001) and Craig et al. (2008) empirically verify a positive relationship between the level 
of guaranteed lending and employment. Bradshaw (2002) confirm this relationship and 
additionally find a net increase in tax revenues. Furthermore, Craig et al. (2007) provide 
evidence that guaranteed lending in a local market is positively related to per-capita 
income growth in that market. 
We construct two alternative lending structures embodying either risk reduction or 
interest-rate-subsidization. We find that both instruments are potentially able to achieve the 
stated objectives, if certain principles are applied. First, federal institutions have to 
implement the so called gap-lending principle. In contrast to Chaney and Thakor (1985), 
our analysis reveals that the public promotion of entrepreneurial investment projects 
should concentrate on those investors that are not able to obtain the necessary financing 
from the credit market and, thus, belong to the market gap. Moreover, cost efficiency 
would require adjusting the subsidy margin to those loan costs that the borrower is not able 
to cover, or, in case of processing costs, to sacrifice this flexibility and grant fixed margins. 
Finally, we find that governmental lending programs can never achieve their goals when 
they are self-financed.75 
In practice, even optimal lending structures are typically applied with restrictions. As 
examples we investigate the policies of two prominent institutions, namely the US 
American Small Business Administration (SBA) and the German Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau (KfW). Figure 3.1 depicts the total funding amount of both institutions 
between 2003 and 2009. Accordingly, the volumes developed quite differently. The SBA’s 
gross approval amount peaked at $22.42 billion in 2004.76 Since then, the volume had been 
                                                 
74 Beck et al. (2010) provide data on 76 partial guarantee schemes across 46 countries.  
75 Public lending institutions that implement self-financing programs try to cover their expenditures by 
charging participants a fee. Examples are the UK’s Loan Guarantee Scheme (LGS) launched by the 
Department of Trade and Industry (see Cowling and Clay, 1995), the American SBA (see SBA, 2005) and 
the Canadian SBLA (see Riding, 1997). 
76 The data are taken from SBA (2010) and do not include the gross approval amount of the Disaster 
Program. 
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basically decreasing, with an acceleration in 2008, due to the global financial crisis. In 
contrast, the KfW expanded its promotional funding continuously (with exception of 2008) 
and reached a volume of €23.77 billion in 2009.77 Although there might be other 
determinants of the contrary developments (e.g. the magnitude of market failure), the 
figure could indicate that both institutions apply different lending structures. Indeed, we 
find differences in the handling of the gap-lending principle, self-financing efforts and 
interest rate limitations. In both cases we find room for additional reform. 
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Figure 3.1: Comparison of the total funding volume of SBA and KfW between 2003 and 200978 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2 we deduce federal 
lending objectives from the statutes of selected governmental institutions. Section 3.3 
introduces a general model of the credit market, which displays a market failure due to 
positive externalities. In sections 3.4 and 3.5 alternative lending structures are formulated 
as well as evaluated with respect to their goal achievement and the conditions for 
optimality are derived. In section 3.6 we apply this framework to the federal lending 
structures of the SBA and the KfW. Section 3.7 shows the stability of our results in a more 
general situation. We conclude in section 3.8 with an interpretation of our results and 
implications for future research. 
 
                                                 
77 The data are taken from KfW Bankengruppe (2003, 2004a, 2005, 2007, and 2009). 
78 Source: Own illustration. 
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3.2 FEDERAL LENDING OBJECTIVES 
The international comparison of federal lending institutions reveals three fundamental 
objectives that are consistently formulated for a large number of federal lending 
programs:79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first objective is based on the assumption that there is some form of imperfection 
in the credit market and that it is the government’s duty to correct the corresponding 
failure. For instance, small and medium-sized enterprises often receive less and smaller 
loans than public institutions find economically desirable. In terms of its strategic plan, the 
American SBA, thus, tries to “increase small business success by bridging competitive 
opportunity gaps facing entrepreneurs” and the Administration is, therefore, “continuing its 
efforts to bridge the gaps the market place does not address” (SBA, 2003). Accordingly, 
Rappaport and Wyatt (1990) speak of the SBA’s “original goal of overcoming an 
imperfection in the business credit market.” Analogously, Cowling and Clay (1995) state 
in their empirical study of the British Loan Guarantee Scheme (LGS) that “the Department 
of Trade and Industry launched the LGS with the intention of ‘filling in’ gaps in the 
availability of loan finance for SMEs in the UK.” Likewise, the final report of the 
European MAP80 points to “the importance of facilitating access to finance for SMEs […] 
through addressing well identified market gaps and/or failures.”81 Finally, Mann and 
Pöhler (2003) take a clear position towards the correction of market failures as a rationale 
for governmental intervention in German credit markets.  
                                                 
79 The sample encompasses the following institutions and programs: the American SBA, the British LGS, the 
European MAP, and the German KfW whose programs additionally serve as patterns in (South-) East 
European countries to support their transition processes towards market economies. 
80 Multiannual Programme for Enterprise and Entrepreneurship, and in particular for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) 2001-2005 
81 See Commission of the European Communities (2004). 
Federal Lending Objectives 
 
1. Correction of market failure 
2. Compliance with the subsidiarity principle, i.e. 
ensuring competitive neutrality 
3. Efficient use of means 
FEDERAL LENDING PROGRAMS 
 
72
The second objective of federal lending institutions is to comply with the subsidiarity 
principle which embodies the requirement for competitive neutrality between the federal 
agency and the private banking sector. Stated differently, credit-market interventions of the 
government must not create additional market distortions by substituting private banks’ 
business. In his cross-country analysis Winkler (1999) claims that federal lending 
institutions, “by their very design, do not compete with commercial banks because they 
function solely as second-tier institutions. As a rule, a [federal agency] will not lend 
directly to the target group, but will channel funds to the final borrowers via local 
commercial banks and savings banks.” The SBA as well as the KfW embedded this rule in 
their corporate laws. In the Small Business Act §7(a)(1)(A) the Administration states 
clearly that “no direct financing may be made unless it is shown that a participation [(i. e. 
guaranteed bank loan)] is not available.”82 The Law concerning the KfW (KfW 
Bankengruppe, 2004b) refers to this objective in §3(1): “In connection with the granting of 
financings […], credit institutions or other financing institutions must be involved […]. In 
carrying out its operations the Institution must respect with regard to credit institutions or 
financing institutions the principle of non-discrimination under European Community 
law.”83 Finally, the Commission of the European Communities (2004) confirms that the 
financial instruments applied under the MAP “operate on a commercial basis, and so do 
not entail market distortions,” which could be generated by direct financing modes. 
The third objective aims at minimizing the costs of lending institutions’ operating 
activities. According to Cowling and Clay (1995), the British LGS was initiated to 
generate a “cost-effective job/wealth generation package.” Analogously, the SBA seeks to 
“ensure that all SBA programs operate at maximum efficiency and effectiveness” (SBA, 
2003). Efficiency is also emphasized by Reich (2002), who lists this objective explicitly 
for the KfW. 
Although there are several other goals that may also be taken into account, the three 
fundamental objectives outlined above are shared by most federal lending institutions. In 
                                                 
82 See also Riding and Haines (2001).  
83 This law also constitutes the basis for the KfW’s outreaching activities to (South-)East European countries. 
Koehn and Erhardt (2004) speak of interventions “guided by the overarching principle of subsidiarity […] 
[and therefore] aim at strengthening local financial intermediaries instead of supporting parallel delivery 
structures.” 
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the course of the subsequent analysis we suppose a hybrid federal agency which takes 
these three objectives as guidelines for policy formulation.  
 
3.3 THE MODEL 
The presence of asymmetric information is the most common explanation for credit 
rationing. Indeed, under information symmetry, it is difficult to justify – from the supply 
side – why some debtors are offered a private bank loan while others are not. 
Theoretically, every risk can be compensated by a payment of the respective risk 
margins.84 Consequently, all applicants should be supplied with a loan by the banking 
sector.  
Nevertheless, it can be observed that debtors are not always able to obtain funds, even 
when their risk properties can be revealed. We explain this phenomenon from the demand 
side: Suppose that all investors value projects by their expected private rates of return. 
Within each risk class there then exist investments, whose return rates exceed or fall short 
of the respective risk corresponding market interest rate. Those investors, whose projects 
feature expected returns that cannot cover the market price, refrain from demanding loans. 
In order to construct a model which solely captures this feature, we assume that 
information between borrowers and debtors is distributed symmetrically, i. e., all investors 
are perfectly informed about federal and market loan conditions of the participating banks. 
Conversely, banks have full information concerning the risks and the expected internal 
return rates of the planned investments. Figure 3.2 depicts the credit market in terms of 
interest rate i  and risk σ . Within this setting the perfectly competitive price-setting 
behavior of the private banking sector is represented by the market interest-rate curve 
( )σMi . This function is increasing in the borrower’s risk level σ 85, due to the fact that 
                                                 
84 Saunders (1997) characterizes the composition of loan interest rates and identifies the credit risk premium 
as “the fundamental factor driving the promised return on a loan”. 
85 We assume that the risk level σ  of the projects accounts for an adjustment of collaterals. Specifically, by 
pledging collaterals, a borrower is able to reduce the remaining project risk to the bank, which, consequently, 
decreases the price of the loan according to the market interest-rate curve. For instance, if an investor’s 
project possesses an initial risk level of 30 percent and the investor is able to cover 50 percent of the risk 
level by collaterals, the collateral adjusted risk level σ  equals 15 percent. Since the market interest-rate 
curve is public information and we assume the investor to know the price decreasing effects of collaterals, he 
can therefore decide if applying for a loan is beneficial. In practice, the borrower receives the necessary 
FEDERAL LENDING PROGRAMS 
 
74
borrowers with higher risks must pay larger risk premiums in order to offset lower 
repayment probabilities. Without loss of generality, we assume that the ( )σMi -curve has a 
linear form.86 
 
i
M
rfi
σ
( )σMi
( )σPi
∗σσ  
Figure 3.2: Market curve, private rate of return function and the loan gap 
 
We focus our analysis on only those entrepreneurial investment projects which feature 
positive external effects, e. g. because of their innovative content.87 As with the market 
rate, we characterize the private rate of return of socially desirable projects by an 
increasing function of the investment risk. In figure 3.2 the distribution of these projects is 
represented by the ( )σPi -curve. Two features of the ( )σPi -curve are crucial for our 
analysis: First, there are investments that obtain financing from the credit market, because 
                                                                                                                                                    
information from negotiations with banks. The inclusion of collaterals into the risk level simplifies the 
analysis, thus allowing us to avoid handling collaterals as an additional parameter within the model. 
86 The positive relationship between terms for bank loans and borrower risk defined by the banks’ internal 
credit rating has been shown to be statistically significant by Machauer and Weber (1998). Although one 
might expect the ( )σMi -curve to be convex, the exact shape crucially depends on how risk is measured. For 
instance, as long as risk is defined in rating terms, e. g. of Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s, the market interest-
rate curve, indeed, has a convex shape. On the other hand, if risk is measured in terms of default 
probabilities, its shape is more likely to be concave. As can be seen later, our results are independent of the 
specific curvature. 
87 Innovating businesses are often the source of so-called R&D spillovers. New knowledge, which is 
generated within the business, is made public when the invention is offered to potential buyers. In this case, 
other market participants also benefit from the generated knowledge, but without having to discharge an 
adequate compensation. Consequently, the social rate of return, encompassing the businesses’ as well as the 
other participants’ surplus from that innovation, exceeds the private rate of return of the considered business.  
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( ) ( )σσ MP ii ≥ , but there are also projects with private rates that do not meet market 
conditions, i. e. where ( ) ( )σσ MP ii < . Second, the vertical distance between the ( )σPi -
curve and the ( )σMi -curve varies for different projects. It is important to note that the 
results of our analysis can be derived for any distribution of eligible investment projects 
with these two features. We verify this claim in section 3.7 by explicitly acknowledging 
individual investment projects. 
In figure 3.2 we denote the critical risk level where ( ) ( )σσ MP ii =  holds by σ . In 
order to specify market failure, we presume for each considered investment project up to a 
certain risk level of σσ >∗  an expected social return rate which lies above the respective 
market interest rate88. By definition, ∗σ  denotes the risk level above which the social rate 
of return is lower than the market interest rate. Projects with higher risk levels should not 
be carried out, because their positive effects on the economy do not justify investment 
costs. Market failure is, therefore, given by the difference: σσ −∗ . We refer to this 
difference as the loan gap. As can be seen from figure 3.2, the loan gap comprises all 
eligible investment projects lying below the market interest-rate curve. These projects are 
not carried out and market failure results. With this assumption, we explicitly presume that 
projects are indivisible and, hence, exclude so-called bootstrapping strategies, by which 
projects are started self-financed at low scale and then gradually grow through generated 
profits. Although this can help investors overcome the loan gap, it is not realistic for 
projects that are of interest to us here, which are characterized by a minimum capital 
requirement that is prohibitively high, e.g. high-tech start-ups. 
The subsidiarity principle embodies the requirement for competitive neutrality 
between the federal agency and the private banking sector. In other words, credit-market 
activities of the public institution must not create additional market distortions by 
negatively affecting private banks’ business. The most common way to fulfill this principle 
is to allocate federal offerings indirectly through private banks. Under this procedure, 
                                                 
88 Griliches (1992) gives an extensive overview of attempts to measure the social rate of return. He argues, 
that in order to measure social returns directly “one has to assume either that their benefits are localized in a 
particular industry or range of products or that there are other ways of identifying the relevant channels of 
influence, that one can detect the path of spillovers in the sands of the data.” He emphasizes that all 
considered studies show social rates of return to be significantly above private rates. 
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private banks only grant loans voluntarily, if their incomes comply with laissez-faire 
market conditions. Consequently, public loan activities are blocked, if private banks are 
not compensated adequately. In the following, we focus on those lending structures which 
utilize this indirect lending procedure and, thus, satisfy the second federal lending 
objective. 
  The efficient use of means, as the third fundamental goal, will be measured in terms 
of the lowest possible costs for a given amount of internalized externalities. In order to 
evaluate federal credit programs from a cost perspective, we assume the number of projects 
in a certain risk class to be limited to one. Consequently, there exist exactly σ  projects 
with a risk of at most σ  in the modeled economy. This enables us to construct cost areas 
within our graphical model as the risk axis now also serves as a quantity axis. 
 
3.4 ALTERNATIVE LENDING STRUCTURES 
We evaluate alternative lending structures by explicitly focusing on two parameters: 
interest rates and risk levels. We justify this approach with the observation that public 
agencies essentially have two instruments to make investment projects marketable: interest 
rate subsidies and measures of risk reduction, e. g. the application of a guarantee rate, 
which we denote by γ .89 In both cases governmental programs lead to a duality of market 
and federal loan prices. We denote the federal interest rates of publicly supported funds by 
( )γσ ,i F , in contrast to the price of a market loan, ( )σMi . 
As a precondition for effectiveness, any federal lending structure must fulfill the 
participation constraints of credit market actors, which are given as follows: The borrower 
applies for a loan, if the project return is sufficiently large to cover his financing costs, i.e. 
( ) ( )γσσ ,ii FP ≥ . In contrast, the bank provides the loan, if it receives a return that equals 
at least the market price. In other words, the (direct or indirect) federal subsidy must be 
                                                 
89 We follow the line of Penner and Silber (1973), who divide mortgage credit programs into first, policies 
designed to affect the interest rate paid by borrowers, without changing the risk characteristics, and second, 
programs designed to change the risk characteristics of mortgages, so that they become more desirable for 
lenders. 
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sufficiently large to cover the difference between the market interest rate ( )σMi  and the 
premium that the bank receives from the investor ( )γσ ,i F .  
For the subsequent analysis, we present two alternative federal credit programs, (a) and 
(b), where each employs one of the two policy instruments. Specifically, program (a) 
consists of a fixed guarantee rate and a market determined interest rate, whereas in 
program (b) the governmental institution subsidizes the market interest rate by a constant 
margin but without any guarantee support. 
 
3.4.1 FIXED GUARANTEE RATE, MARKET DETERMINED INTEREST RATE 
Within structure (a) the federal agency offers a guarantee rate of a fixed percentage 
0>= γγ  to all investors, while letting the interest rate adjust to market price conditions, 
i.e. ( ) ( )σγσ γ MF i,i ==0 . The guarantee reduces the private banks’ costs of credit risk, thus 
inducing them to lower the price for the guarantee complemented funds in a competitive 
market. As a consequence, lower risk premiums let investors’ demand for conditioned 
federal loans rise. The implications of structure (a) are illustrated in figure 3.3. The market 
interest rate curve for guaranteed loans is denoted by ( )γσ ,i F . Since federal lending 
reduces the risk of financing a given project from σ  to ( )σγ−1 , the ( )γσ ,i F -curve results 
from a downward rotation of the ( )σMi -curve at its ordinate intersection, i. e. the risk-free 
interest rate Mrfi . Hence, public risk coverage rises with the level of risk. 
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Figure 3.3: Fixed guarantee rate, market determined interest rate 
 
3.4.2 FIXED INTEREST SUBSIDIZATION, NO GUARANTEE 
Under structure (b) the federal agency offers loan endowments with a constant interest-rate 
subsidization, regardless of the project’s risk ( ) ( )( )σγσ γ MF i,i <=0 . However, the agency 
refrains from warranting guarantees to private banks ( 0=γ ). This setting characterizes the 
current lending arrangement of the German KfW in a significant part of its programs. 
According to Stiglitz and Ellerman (2000) interest rate subsidies are also common in 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales. The qualitative outcome is the same as with structure (a), 
namely a subsidization of the private banks’ cost structures. Consequently, the banking 
sector competes with loan prices until profit levels match the former market situation. 
Figure 3.4 shows the effect of structure (b) on the credit market. Graphically, the agency 
transfers the margin Frf
M
rf ii −  to the private bank, thus inducing a parallel downward shift of 
the ( )σMi -curve. The subsidized interest rate curve ( )0,i F σ  now constitutes the new 
borrowers’ market conditions. 
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Figure 3.4: Fixed interest subsidization, no guarantee 
 
 
3.5 OPTIMAL LENDING STRUCTURES  
In order to compare the alternative lending structures, we assess their goal achievement 
given the three fundamental objectives, namely correction of market failure, compliance 
with the subsidiarity principle, and efficient use of means. 
Complete market failure correction requires the following condition to hold: 
(3.1) ( ) [ ]*,),( σσσσγσ ∈∀≤ PF ii . 
As one can verify from figures 3.3 and 3.4, in both scenarios described in the previous 
section, the federal agency achieves a complete market failure correction, provided 
subsidies are available and sufficiently large for all projects within the loan gap.90 
Independent of the respective policy, the interest rate that all loan-gap applicants discharge 
must be covered by the expected returns of their projects to ensure their participation in the 
federal lending program.  
                                                 
90 Note that, for Mrf
P i)(i <σ , a market failure correction cannot be achieved by guarantees. Regardless of 
the guarantee in the contract, the private bank would always obtain an interest rate that falls short of the 
corresponding market interest rate. 
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By construction, both lending structures also comply with the subsidiarity principle. 
Note that market conditioned loans are fully crowded out by public loans, irrespective of 
the underlying risk properties. In other words, no applicant with a risk profile between 0  
and ∗σ  demands a non-subsidized loan with a higher price. Nevertheless, the subsidiarity 
principle ensures that the private banking sector can distribute subsidized loans in a 
competitively neutral form. 
In order to assess the efficient use of means of both alternative lending structures, the 
different costs of market failure correction are displayed by areas A , B , C , and D  in 
panels (a) and (b) of figure 3.5, respectively. The two figures correspond to figures 3.3 and 
3.4 of the preceding section. As a new element, figure 3.5 also features the ( )γσ ,i F∗ -curve 
which characterizes a cost minimal policy for the given lending structures of the preceding 
section. Efficiency is, therefore, reached when the subsidy level is set at the minimum level 
which is necessary to eliminate market failure. Mathematically, the ( )γσ ,i F∗ -curve is 
obtained from the following optimization problem: 
(3.2) ( )
( )
( ) ( )[ ] σγσσγσ σ
σγσ
d ,ii,i FP
,i
F
F ∫
∗
∗ −= min arg    subject to condition (3.1). 
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(a) Fixed guarantee rate, market interest rate                     (b) Fixed interest subsidization, no guarantee 
Figure 3.5: The costs of alternative lending structures 
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For any lending structure, equation (3.2) describes the necessary condition to achieve 
an interior optimum. However, it does not question whether the structure itself is optimal. 
In panels (a) and (b) of figure 3.5 areas B , C , and D  characterize the redistribution of 
capital from the agency to investors of all risk classes without any superior goal 
achievement, thus quantifying the inefficiencies of the individual lending structures. In 
contrast, area A  represents costs that are necessary to correct the market failure. Under an 
optimal lending structure it is, therefore, sufficient to reimburse the private banking sector 
for only those costs that investors in the loan gap are not able to cover. In other words, 
investors should be obliged to carry credit costs up to the maximum amount ( )σPi  that is 
covered by their project. For the federal interest rate this implies 
(3.3) ( ) ( ) [ ]*,i,i P*F σσσσγσ ∈∀=   and 
( ) ( ) [ )σσσγσ ,0i,i M*F ∈∀= . 
Condition (3.3) requires the public agency to implement a federal interest rate for loan 
gap applicants which corresponds exactly to the respective private return rate of the 
project. To accomplish this, one option is to reimburse the private bank with a flexible 
interest margin. Alternatively, the agency could provide a flexible guarantee rate, which 
reduces any risk level [ ]∗∈′ σσσ ,  to a lower level σ ′′ , in order to meet market conditions, 
where σ ′′  is related to σ ′  through the condition ( ) ( )σσ ′=′′ PM ii . The minimum costs that 
are necessary to correct market failure are then given by area A  in figure 3.6. 
Our result has two important implications. First, the federal agency must only promote 
those risky investments which belong to the loan gap, i. e. [ ]∗∈′ σσσ , . Consequently, a 
cost-minimizing agency should act as a pure gap lender, if it wishes to avoid promoting 
projects, which would also be financed by the private banking sector without intervention. 
This implies that the lending structures discussed above both entail inefficiencies.  
Second, market failure based on positive externalities cannot be corrected by a self-
financing lending program. Any fee required to finance the subsidy margin can be 
interpreted as a reduction of the expected private rate of return, which by itself would 
already require a higher subsidy margin. By giving the fee back to investors in the form of 
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Figure 3.6: Minimal costs of the optimal lending structure 
 
an interest-rate subsidy or a guarantee, the private rate of return could at best reach its 
initial level. Consequently, the costs of area A  cannot be covered by investors, since they 
can afford to pay only ( )σPi .91 
In practice, however, processing costs arise, because the guarantee rate or, 
alternatively, the reimbursement interest margin must be adjusted to the characteristics of 
every specific project in order to achieve optimality. As long as processing costs are 
sufficiently large – at least as large as area B  in figure 3.7 – the federal agency should 
either introduce a fixed guarantee rate (panel (a)) or a constant interest margin (panel (b)), 
while both should be available only for loan-gap applicants. The amount of the 
corresponding subsidy is given by the following optimization problem: 
(3.4) ( )
( )
( ) ( )[ ]∫ −= * FP
,i
*F d,ii,i
F
σ
σγσ
σγσσγσ min arg  
subject to condition (3.1) and ( ) ( ) [ )σσσγσ ,0i,i M*F ∈∀= . 
 
                                                 
91 The funds required to finance area A  have to be taken from alternative sources, e.g. tax receipts. The 
government could try to raise taxes, in particular, in those areas where the innovative investment causes the 
strongest external effects, so that at least a partial internalization is achieved. 
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(a) Fixed guarantee rate, market interest rate                   (b) Fixed interest subsidization, no guarantee 
Figure 3.7: Optimal lending structure in presence of processing costs 
 
By fixing guarantee rates or interest-rate subsidies, minimum costs of the amount 
BA+  accrue when the gap-lending principle is applied.92 In contrast, if policy instruments 
were risk-dependent, the ( )γσ ,i F∗ -curve could be adjusted flexibly to the ( )σPi -curve. 
Specifically, optimality then requires the subsidy margin to be adjusted flexibly to the 
exact financial needs of the debtor (area A ). The situation changes, though, when 
processing costs are taken into account. Programs with fixed spending margins then 
become optimal. Area B , thus, displays the additional costs of designing risk-independent 
promotional instruments.93 
In contrast to areas A  and B , which have a specific function in correcting market 
failure, areas C  and D  in figure 3.5 depict costs that are avoidable. Specifically, area C  
represents costs that arise from violating the gap-lending principle, i. e. expenditures from 
promoting projects that could just as well be served by the market. In contrast, area- D  
costs are related to loan-gap applicants, but they exceed the amount necessary to correct 
market failure, e. g. due to imprecise policy targeting. It should be noted, however, that the 
implementation of ( )γσ ,i F∗  and, hence, the avoidance of these excess subsidies, requires 
                                                 
92 It is important to note that the proposed model only allows for qualitative statements. Although area B  is 
smaller in panel (a) compared to (b), it cannot be concluded that a fixed guarantee rate basically causes less 
costs. 
93 In practice, the additional expenditures of the amount B  should be economically justified by the social 
rate of return of loan-gap projects.  
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exact knowledge of ( )σPi . In practice, the acknowledgement of area- D  costs, therefore, 
seems inevitable. 
 
3.6 THE LENDING STRUCTURES OF THE SBA AND KFW 
The lending structure with a fixed guarantee rate for loan gap applicants corresponds to the 
policy of the American SBA’s 7(a) Loan Guarantee Program. To ensure that only the loan 
gap is filled, banks must verifiably deny a loan offer under market conditions – this is 
referred to as the Credit Elsewhere Test (SBA, 2004, §7.(a)(1)(A)): “CREDIT 
ELSEWHERE. - No financial assistance shall be extended pursuant to this subsection if 
the applicant can obtain credit elsewhere. […]”94 Within our framework the institutional 
arrangement of the SBA is generally optimal, provided that processing costs are 
sufficiently large.  
However, the SBA places two operational barriers on its program. First, “the SBA’s 
legislative package includes language that will give the agency the authority to adjust the 
fees every year to keep the 7(a) program at a zero subsidy.”95 As the preceding analysis 
shows, a completely self-financing program can never correct market failure.96 Second, the 
SBA places an upper limit, iˆ , on the interest rate charged by private banks when loans are 
complemented by federal guarantees.97 Figure 3.8 depicts the impact of the SBA’s 
practiced lending policy of a fixed guarantee rate and an interest-rate limitation.  
Within the framework of our model, the interest-rate cap could again interfere with the 
SBA’s objective of complete market failure correction. As long as the loan price limit iˆ  
lies above ( )γσ ,i F  [ ]∗∈∀ σσσ , , the interest-rate cap is ineffective and, thus, does not 
                                                 
94 According to Riding and Haines (2001) lenders under the UK’s Loan Guarantee Scheme must also certify 
to have denied applicants a conventional loan, due to lack of collateral. Hence, the UK’s Department of 
Trade and Industry may also be considered as a gap lender. In contrast, Hatakeyama et al. (1997) state that 
“the credit guarantee corporations of Japan and the Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KCGF) have set clear 
policies of extending guarantee services to any small entrepreneurs with good business reputation.” 
95 See SBA (2005). 
96 As an example for the ineffectiveness of self-financing programs, Cowling (1998) analyses the attempts of 
the British LGS to avoid former losses by equalizing revenues and expenditures. In 1984, the increase of the 
guarantee premium from 3 to 5% and the reduction of the guarantee rate from 80 to 70% resulted in a 
dramatic fall of take-up rates from 1,600 to 40 loans per quarter. 
97 Interest-rate caps are common in other countries as well (Riding and Haines, 2001). For instance, the 
Canadian Small Business Loan Act (SBLA) limits the maximum mark-up on the risk-less market interest rate 
by 1.75 percent. 
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Figure 3.8: The lending policy of the SBA 
 
hinder market failure correction. In this case, the SBA would, indeed, implement the 
optimal lending structure. On the other hand, if ( ) ( )γσγσ ,iiˆ,i FF ∗<< , objective 1 is no 
longer met. For project risks above σˆ 98 the interest-rate cap renders the private bank’s 
compensation below market conditions and thus impedes its cooperation – this is the case 
illustrated in figure 3.8. In the worst case, iˆ  falls short of ( )γσ ,i F  [ ]∗∈∀ σσσ , . As a 
consequence, the SBA cannot correct market failure with a fixed guarantee rate at all, and 
the market situation is the same as without governmental intervention. Since any effective 
interest-rate limitation below the ( )γσ ,i F -curve impedes market-failure correction, our 
analysis suggests that the SBA should operate without these additional restrictions.99 
An alternative arrangement is implemented by the German KfW. According to §1a of 
the Law Concerning KfW (KfW Bankengruppe, 2004b), the German government 
guarantees all obligations of the federal agency entailing an AAA-refinancing status. These 
refinancing conditions have then been made available for private banks’ federal loan 
transactions, resulting in an interest-rate subsidy margin. In April, 2005, the KfW 
transformed its lending structure by changing the mode of its loan price subsidization. 
                                                 
98 σˆ  can be obtained from the equation ( )γσ ,ˆiiˆ F= . 
99 In support of this conclusion, the European Commission (2003) argues that “for allowing the microcredit 
operator to be fully self-sustainable, the public authority could increase the ceiling of usury rate, in countries 
where such a rate is legally binding.” 
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Under the new structure the institution switched from fixed to risk-dependent interest rates 
and abolished the warranting of guarantees. Nevertheless, similar to the SBA, the KfW 
continues to limit the price-setting scope for private banks by now administering interest-
rate caps for every specially defined risk class.  
Under the present KfW lending structure (figure 3.5, panel (b)) optimal lending is 
possible, in principle, given that processing costs are sufficiently large. Nevertheless, our 
analysis shows that two potential obstacles still need to be removed to ensure optimality. 
First, the KfW should refrain from offering its loan conditions to all eligible investors and, 
instead, focus on loan-gap applicants. Second, in line with our argument concerning the 
SBA, the KfW should abolish its interest-rate limitation. 
 
3.7 GENERALIZATION OF THE MODEL  
Our conclusions in the previous sections were all derived within the analytical framework 
based on the construction of the ( )σPi -curve in figure 3.2. In this section we show how 
our results carry over to a more general situation, where socially desirable investments are 
scattered around the market interest-rate curve, instead of being allocated along a clearly 
defined ( )σPi -curve. The significant difference between both approaches is given by 
diverging distributions of investment projects and, thereby, varying degrees of market 
failure.  
In figure 3.2 the market failure is depicted on the risk axis by the risk interval, in 
which the ( )σPi -curve falls short of the market interest-rate curve. In the more general 
setting, though, the market gap cannot be determined on the basis of risk levels alone. 
Moreover, in order to identify whether a particular investment project is situated below the 
market curve, additional knowledge of the private rate of return is required.  
Without loss of generality, consider, for example, lending structure (b), depicted in 
figure 3.5, where the federal agency subsidizes the interest rate imposed on eligible 
projects by a constant amount. The associated costs, characterized by areas A , B , C , and 
D , can be represented in figure 3.9 by the vertical distances a , b , c , and d  for three 
representative investment projects. 
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Figure 3.9: Transferability of derived results 
 
The distance to the market interest rate curve is largest for project 1P , which we 
suppose represents the marginal project that the federal agency must promote in order to 
fully correct market failure. To make this project marketable a minimum subsidy of the 
amount 1a  is required. In practice, the actual reimbursement margin will presumably 
exceed the necessary minimum 1a , thus creating a slack which we denote by d .  
Due to the policy of a constant subsidy margin, the same cumulative amount da +1  
must be granted to all projects. Therefore, consider next project 2P , another candidate for 
promotion. This investment could be subsidized with a minimum amount 2a , but the 
additional cost 21 aab −=  arises, because of the non-risk adjusted constant subsidy 
margin. In addition, the slack d  accrues here as well. Finally, consider project 3P , which 
normally should not be eligible for promotion under the gap-lending principle, since its 
private rate of return meets market requirements. Hence, federal funds spent on this project 
create costs of the amount c  ( dbada ++=+= 21 ), which could also be avoided under an 
optimal lending structure.  
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3.8 CONCLUSION 
Our objective in this chapter was to develop a general framework for evaluating alternative 
federal lending structures by means of an interest-rate-risk model and observable federal 
lending objectives. Our comparison reveals that federal credit programs are only efficient 
when they are designed as gap-lending structures. This entails the promotion of only those 
applicants that are not able to obtain financing from the credit market. Ideally, the subsidy 
margin should exactly reimburse the loan costs that investors are not able to pay 
themselves, i. e. the difference between market loan costs and the private rate of return. 
Since this requires a flexible subsidy margin that has to be adjusted to the project 
characteristics in each individual case, lending structures, which do not employ such 
flexible instruments, can never achieve optimality. As we pointed out, though, the 
adjustment of risk dependent instruments causes processing costs. Thus, with sufficiently 
high processing costs, the least expensive way of correcting market failure is to impose a 
constant subsidy margin over all projects. We also showed that every federal lending 
system which aims at correcting market failure, due to positive externalities, requires 
governmental cost contributions and, thus, cannot be self-financing. This result stands in 
line with the analyses of Gale (1990) and Williamson (1994), who derive similar results for 
credit markets characterized by asymmetric information. 
In practice, as we have found, the derived conditions for optimal lending structures are 
not consistently applied. Although the American SBA does act as gap lender, it 
simultaneously limits the interest rate that can be maximally charged by private banks, if 
loans are complemented by federal guarantees. In addition, the SBA’s statutes require the 
agency to act as self-financer, i.e., to finance the 7(a) loan guarantee program with the fees 
of participants. These two restrictions could prevent the SBA from achieving market 
failure correction. Interest-rate caps can also be observed with the policy of the German 
KfW. Moreover, the KfW promotes investors regardless of whether or not they can obtain 
financing elsewhere, thus indicating structural inefficiencies here as well. Unless the 
current practices of the SBA and KfW can be justified with arguments beyond the scope of 
our model, we see room for greater efficiency and, thus, further reform with both 
institutions. 
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Our analysis is intended to support the decision making process of federal institutions 
in optimizing their lending structures. We therefore modeled public credit programs along 
their two most basic dimensions, i.e. risk and interest rates. In practice, however, financial 
institutions decide on additional parameters as well, such as loan size or repayment terms. 
Specifically, it is quite common to refuse the subsidization of loans whose volumes exceed 
a specific limit. In contrast to commercial banks, public institutions also ease the terms of 
repayment by extending maturities and permitting repayment-free periods. These benefits 
are primarily intended to meet the needs of start-ups which typically face negative cash 
flows in the first months of operation. An inclusion of these elements into the analysis 
would allow for a more detailed characterization of optimal federal lending structures. 
Another issue that demands further research concerns the social rate of return. As we 
have argued, this rate needs to be assessed in order to identify market failure. Specifically, 
the lending institution is required to find out if the financing costs of a loan-gap project fall 
below the sum of the investor’s return and the total benefits to others outside the 
innovation’s market. Although, there might be projects with an obvious social-return 
overhead, e.g. radical technology innovations, there exist marginal cases for which a 
precise assessment proves difficult or prohibitively costly. In general, federal institutions 
could cope with the limited knowledge of social returns by defining criteria that help 
identify eligible projects, e.g. branch or type of innovation. An extension of our framework 
to such eligibility criteria would increase the practicability of our derived policy 
implications.  
Finally, our analysis has been limited to federal lending so far. However, governments 
often run parallel equity programs aimed at promoting high-risk ventures. For example, the 
SBA invests via privately owned Small Business Investment Companies (SBIC) and the 
KfW co-finances start-ups, SMEs, and technological firms through the ERP Start Fund. 
Studying both generic alternatives of finance simultaneously would tackle the issue of an 
optimally combined application in market failure correction. 
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